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Chapter One
Public Disapproval of Congress and Congressional Elections:
An Overview

Over the past half-century, the United States Congress has become less revered by the
American people. The Constitution names Congress as the first branch of government. The
framers instituted Congress in Article One of the Constitution to symbolize the importance of the
rule of law of the people. Its members were to be chosen members of the public, rather than
royalty or nobility, to give the branch a sense of democratic legitimacy. However, during the
past fifty years, public opinion of the first branch of government has waned.
The reasons for this diminished respect are complex and numerous. In general terms, the
public disapproves of Congress due to low regard for the members of Congress, the legislative
process, policy output of the body, dislike of Congress as an institution, and external forces such
as the media and the economy which cause people to have a poor opinion of Congress. Since the
1960s, public approval of Congress has remained low, in large part due to the reasons
enumerated above.
Congressional elections in general follow predicable patterns. All congressional
elections are affected by the incumbency advantage, issues pertaining to campaign finance,
gerrymandering and its affect on party identification, national trends, the state of the economy,
and the media. Subsequent chapters to this thesis will answer the following question: are
congressional elections influenced by levels of public approval of Congress? An examination of
a possible relationship between public opinion of Congress and congressional elections will be
furthered by case studies of the 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010 midterm elections. However, the
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goal of this chapter is to analyze the appropriate literature pertaining to public opinion of
Congress and congressional elections in general.

Why the Public Dislikes Congress
The fact that the public largely disapproves of Congress has been a political reality for
the past fifty years. Levels of trust in government as a whole have declined since the 1960s, and
have remained below 50% since 1974 (Orren 1997). The lowest level of public trust in
government since 1958 was approximately 20% in 1994 (Orren 1997). Disapproval of Congress
stems from a dislike of the members of Congress, the legislative process, policy concerns, dislike
of Congress as an institution, and external forces such as the media and the economy. Later
chapters of this thesis will determine if low approval of Congress affects election outcomes.

Members of Congress
The first reason people dislike Congress is dissatisfaction with its members. Perquisites
of being a congressperson, isolation from constituents, and personal scandals lower public
approval of Congress and its members. One fear of the public is that the members of Congress
abuse their position for self-benefit, instead of helping their constituents. “[The people] believe
members of Congress could be using their power for the good of the country, but instead use it
for their own self-interested advantage” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 62). Traditional
thought dictates that representatives should actively advocate for their constituents in an effort to
solve their problems. However, the public fears that representatives are enjoying the perquisites
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of office, such as free dry cleaning, meals, transportation, and Washington social gatherings,
while disregarding the issues facing everyday people. The people in general approve of their
own representatives, but believe that other representatives abuse the privileges associated with
holding office (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 2003, 2007; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
1995). Part of the reason the public fears congressional isolation from the people is the result of
personal and political scandals.
Political scandals cause a loss of faith in the members of Congress (Orren 1997). Since
the 1980s, a rise in publicized personal scandals has caused the public to lose respect for
members of Congress. A recent election cycle that was riddled with political scandals was the
2006 midterm elections (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007). These scandals plagued the
Republican party during that year. In November of 2005, California Republican Representative
Randy “Duke” Cunningham “pleaded guilty to bribery charges and resigned from the House”
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 275). In April of 2006, “Majority Leader Tom DeLay of
Texas announced that he was resigning from the House” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007,
275). This came “three days after his former deputy chief of staff had pleaded guilty to
conspiracy and corruption charges in an investigation of influence buying by Republican lobbyist
Jack Abramoff” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 275). Bob Ney of Ohio pled guilty to
corruption charges, and resigned from the House of Representatives after initially declining to
seek reelection (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007). Perhaps the most damaging scandal was
that of Representative Mark Foley of Florida, who “sent sexually suggestive electronic messages
to teenage boys who had worked as House pages” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 275).
Although Foley resigned immediately, news broke out that House Republican leaders knew
about the scandal, causing those leaders to lose influence themselves. Such scandals lead the
3

public to question politicians’ ethics, and presume a “lack of honesty and integrity” among
representatives (Orren 1997, 92). Some argue that the subsequent uneasiness felt by the people
is part of “a collapse of trust in human nature” itself (Orren 1997, 85). Regardless, the belief of
the public that representatives lack moral decency leads to a lower approval rating of the
legislators.
Seemingly extravagant perquisites of being a representative or Senator also prompt
disapproval of Congress. The public believes that the perquisites of being a congressperson are
simply too luxurious. Special perks are perceived by the public as wasteful and symbolic of the
belief that the representatives are not hard-working (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). In
addition, the public believes that the perquisites of office cause representatives to lose touch with
reality. One focus-group participant on the subject raised this fear. “Free haircuts. Free lunch.
They’ve got a free dining room. They get their free dry cleaning. I mean they just lose all sense
of reality” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 67). The public’s belief that their representatives
are out of touch and have lost a connection with their constituents damages the public’s
perception of the members of Congress. Surprisingly, the people in certain circumstances
actually underestimate the perquisites of office. In these cases the perquisites of office are wellhidden by Congress. Thus, if they were told the truth, that the perquisites of some officeholders
are greater than widely believed, the people’s anger could be exacerbated (Hibbing and TheissMorse 1995).
As a complement to the special perquisites of office, the public is wary of the
“Washington System,” which is believed to corrupt congressional members. Although the
people believe that their own representatives adequately respond to their grievances, as a whole
they believe Congress is out of touch. “[The Washington System] seduces members away from
4

fulfilling their responsibility to the public” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 62). The
extravagant Washington D.C. scene is one in which power and prestige, along with privileges
enjoyed by the representatives, dominate the daily lives of members of Congress. The perceived
effect of the Washington System is that representatives are so caught up in the glory and special
privileges of being a congressperson that issues pertinent to the people are ignored. The image
of a representative sipping champagne in Washington D.C. while citizens are losing their jobs is
one which angers the people, especially during uneasy economic times. If the people are
suffering economically, yet representatives are enjoying the perks of office and fielding large
salaries, the public will become spiteful. This spite can result in popular demands for
administrative change. It should be noted that this demand for change rarely includes an
individual’s own congressperson. Individuals overwhelming approve of their own
representatives (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 2003, 2007; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
1995). Perhaps John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (1995, 62) summarize the public’s
feelings about the Washington System best:
Members of Congress are quickly corrupted by special interests and lobbyists, by the
office perquisites they receive, and by the people who surround and indulge them…The
various congressional scandals that [receive attention in] the media simply provide proof
that the public judgment is correct.
Although public opinion of Congress is negatively affected by the public perception of
the members of the body, it should not be assumed that the people want to take on a larger role in
the democratic process. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, 9) note, the people “desire to give
decision-making to someone else…as long as [those representatives] are barred from taking
advantage of their position for personal gain.” Charges of politicians using their office for
personal gain are the driving force behind the public’s disapproval of Congress pertaining to the
representatives themselves. However, at most, the people want the power to check their
5

representatives, but never to have to use that power (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
Unfortunately, representatives simply don’t measure up to the public’s expectations of them, by
personal and policy-output standards (Orren 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). The people
want their representatives to conduct themselves in such as manner as to benefit the public, not
the representatives themselves. The failure to do so, combined with policies the public finds
suspect, can result in a lower approval rating of representatives (Orren 1997; Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 2002).
Another reason why representatives don’t satisfy the public’s expectations is that the
people demand that their representatives find and apply solutions to problems. However, a reality
of being a politician is that one must often vote along predetermined party lines for political
survival. Adherence to a party’s general platform is necessary for securing future support in
elections. This support comes in the form of official party endorsements and monetary
donations. After all, the main goal of a politician is to be re-elected, and without the support of
one of the major parties, the chances of election or re-election are diminished. However, voting
along party lines is not associated with active problem-solving (Sinclair 2000). The solutions to
everyday problems and big issues are often not found in general party platforms, to which
representatives are forced to adhere. Luckily for the constituents, the “recorded vote” allows a
voter to see exactly how an incumbent voted, or if she/he abstained from a vote (Arnold 2004,
92). Thus, while campaigning for re-election, an incumbent must answer to his/her actions or
lack thereof on specific issues. However, although this check is in place, the fact remains that
voting along party lines is seen by the public as a sign of poor congressional performance
(Sinclair 2000). An additional obstacle for representatives is that solutions to everyday problems
are not always clear-cut. The public believes solutions are available, but often this is not the
6

case. This unwarranted assumption forces representatives into a position where they are set-up
to fail (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Complex issues, for which legislation will affect
different segments of the population in different ways, make legislating difficult. One policy that
may benefit one group could likewise harm another. However, individual constituents are selfserving and demand solutions to their own problems. The gap between individuals’ demands
and feasible political realities damages public opinion of Congress. Decisions in Congress are
often based on compromise, which signals to the public that for many issues complete solutions
are nonexistent (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Yet, “the people prefer politics to include
minimal debate and compromise, regardless of the groups doing the debating or compromising”
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 136).

The Legislative Process
The second set of reasons why the public largely disapproves of Congress is the
legislative process. Approval may be generic to the system, that is, “[it may] respond to the
generalized satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the state of things” (Stimson 2004, 154).
However, the fact remains that the people dislike the workings of Congress itself, irrespective of
policy output, the general state of the economy, or as Stimson (2004, 154) characterized, the
“state of things.” The pubic finds the legislative process inherent to Congress quite irksome. “In
October 1992…Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-N.Y.) held the floor for fifteen hours and fifteen
minutes to protest the removal from an urban-aid tax bill of a provision he said could have
restored jobs at a New York typewriter plant” (Sinclair 2000, 66). This is an example of the
filibuster, which is seen as time-wasting, frustrating, and inefficient. Filibusters are used to halt
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legislative action, usually by the minority party in protest of the majority-party agenda. “A
Republican filibuster killed Bill Clinton’s stimulus package; Republicans used the filibuster or a
threat thereof to extract concessions on a number of bills, two being voter registration
legislation…and the national service program” (Sinclair 2000, 67). Filibusters and cloture votes,
which block debate from even occurring, are a signal to the public of an unwillingness of
representatives to work across party lines. In addition, filibusters and cloture votes are the
epitome of inefficiency. The use of cloture votes has steadily increased since the 1990s (Sinclair
2000). Through the use of these legal blockades, a minority party can cause gridlock in
Congress (Sinclair 2000). This intentional gridlock by the minority party is seen by the public as
inefficient and wasteful, and contributes to overall public disapproval.
The use of Unanimous Consent Agreements by the Senate also has the potential to irritate
the public, due to an arbitrariness of the rules regarding their use (Evans and Oleszek 2000). A
UCA is a “device used to establish procedural ground rules for the consideration of legislation
and to impose time limits on debate and amendments” (Evans and Oleszek 2000, 81). UCAs are
generally agreed upon by both parties before debate on a specific issue begins. UCAs can
institutionally limit the scope of the legislative amendment process or time allotted for discussion
on important issues. Thus, issues are not always thoroughly debated, which is worrisome for
those members of the public directly affected by the legislation and for representatives who
desire more comprehensive debate. This issue has been debated for decades. “In July 1952
Senator Wayne Morse (R-Oreg.) took to the floor to complain that ‘under the modern, postwar
practice, unanimous-consent agreements are made to close debate on almost every major bill’”
(Evans and Oleszek 2000, 90). UCAs, which are tools for Congress intended to expedite the
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legislative process, institutionally limit the ability of representatives to debate the nuances of
legislation.
The public in general is irritated by the legislative process inherent to Congress. Hibbing
and Theiss Morse (2002) argue that public dissatisfaction with Congress is due only partly, but
not mainly, to legislative output from the body. Thus, legislative process is a salient issue when
determining public approval of Congress. Legislating in Congress is a cumbersome process
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). “Congress embodies practically everything Americans
dislike about politics” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 60). The public is wary of drawn-out
and complicated legislative actions on behalf of Congress, because the people believe that
practical solutions are available to solve the most complex of issues. The fact that the American
people believe that the public generally agrees “on overall societal goals” fuels their feeling that
drawn-out debate by representatives, on many issues, is unnecessary (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
2002, 156). Yet, fundamental differences in opinion among members of the public are a political
reality, as evidenced by heated debate surrounding issues such as abortion and stem-cell
research, among others. Solutions are not always clear to, or quickly enacted by, members of
Congress, which by definition represent diverse interests from across the country. The resultant
public nature of debate within Congress leads to visible disagreement on the issues, which the
public finds distasteful. “The American people want democratic procedures, but they do not
want to see them in action” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 19). Rather, the people want
members of Congress to conduct themselves in a process that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995,
2002) label stealth democracy.
Another part of the legislative process of Congress which leads to public disapproval is
the prevalence and persuasiveness of special interests. The public believes that the government
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is run by “a few big interests” and that “quite a few people running government are crooked”
(Orren, 1997, 82). This corruption, the people believe, stems from the willingness of
representatives to take favors and bribes from powerful special interests (Hibbing and TheissMorse 2002). Bribes are supposedly offered to ensure that Congress legislates in such a way as
to benefit those special interests. As a result, the legitimacy of the democratic system is
challenged. If those individuals and groups with the most money to give representatives bribes
garner special treatment from those representatives, the prospect of equal representation and
equality in voting is threatened. The basic tenet that “all men are created equal” is thus
challenged when special interests receive more congressional support than the average citizen.
The people want their interests to be equally weighed with those of the special interests, yet the
power of special interests can have the effect of precluding this standard of equality. Traditional
advocacy is replaced with bribery and corruption. Regardless, the public at large is susceptible
to legislation aimed at appeasing special interests. “People’s most intense desire for the political
process is that it not take advantage of them by allowing certain entities such as special interests
and elected officials to reap personal gains at the expense of ordinary people” (Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 2002, 130). This desire, when not fulfilled, leads to a lower approval rating of
Congress by the people. The belief that representatives are reaping personal rewards at the
expense of the needs of the public leads to a lack of confidence in the institution of Congress.
The perception of institutional effectiveness can benefit the party in control of Congress.
Coming off of their historic victory in the 1994 midterm elections and the “Republican
Revolution,” which will be evaluated in detail in later chapters of this thesis, it was very
important for the Republican party to maintain control of the House of Representatives in the
1996 election (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999). In 1994, the public supported Republican
10

Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde
1999, 207). Within this “contract” was a ten-point plan, which was finished within the promised
first one hundred days of the 104th Congress. The fact that Congress completed its proposal was
a sign of effective action. After the first one hundred days, Congress moved to reform the
budget and appropriations process, wasting no time and signaling to the public a willingness to
act (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999). This ability to legislate effectively gained the support
of the public, which disapproves of the normally cumbersome legislative process (Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 1995, 2002). Public support of Congress due to an effective legislative process,
however, is rare. In a recent Gallup poll conducted by Lydia Saad (2010a), Congress ranked last
in confidence in institutions. Fifty percent responded with “very little” or “no” confidence in
Congress as an institution. The lowest response rate for all of the institutions studied, which
included the presidency, the Supreme Court, and the military among others, was Congress,
which is troubling for that which is constitutionally the most powerful branch of government.
Measured confidence in Congress decreased by six percentage points from 2009 to 2010 (Saad
2010a). This poll was conducted from July 8 to July 11 of 2010, but is indicative of long-term
trends of confidence in Congress.

Policy Concerns of the Public
Another basis for why the people dislike Congress is its policy output. In part, the people
evaluate Congress based on their personal perception of how they think representatives are doing
their jobs, and the degree of sufficient policy representation (Jones and McDermott 2009). This
last criterion identified by Jones and McDermott (2009) manifests itself in a specific manner, in
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that policies are not debated in the abstract, but in light of the actual effects on the people.
Although the legislative process is important in people’s evaluations of Congress, policy output
also affects public opinion (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Jones and McDermott 2009).
Indeed, “at a minimum, one can safely conclude that policy compatibility with Congress,
variously measured, significantly and consistently correlates with an individual’s approval of
Congress” (Jones and McDermott 2009, 21). “When Americans register their disapproval with
the performance of Congress, they do so in part because they are unhappy with the policy actions
of Congress as run by the majority party” (Jones and McDermott 2009, 13). In short, if a person
agrees on an ideological level with the legislation Congress passes, he or she will support further
measures of Congress, while those who disagree will be more suspicious of any future
legislation. These feelings are a product of which of the two major parties holds the majority.
More broadly, “public confidence in institutions is subject to short-term political events,”
including scandals, but certainly the passage of landmark legislation (Gronke, Hicks and Cook
2010, 209; see also Stimson 2004). Legislation passed by Congress is usually in line with the
party ideology of the majority party. The party that has a majority of votes is better able to pass
legislation than the minority party. Thus, those members of the public who share the majority
party’s overall ideology are more likely to approve of that specific Congress’ legislation. Jones
and McDermott (2009) evaluated public opinion of the Republican controlled 108th Congress,
taking into account respondents’ ideology. They found that “only 34 percent of liberals
[approved] of Congress, 57 percent of moderates [approved], and 66 percent of conservatives
[approved], as one would expect in reaction to a Republican-controlled Congress with a
relatively conservative policy agenda” (Jones and McDermott 2009, 26).
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Traditional literature assumed that the public is largely unaware of the policy decisions
enacted by Congress. However, Jones and McDermott (2009) show that the public has greater
knowledge of policy issues than has traditionally been presumed. They characterize public
knowledge as fleeting, but evident. Citizens may not remember the specifics of policies or
legislation enacted, but they do use policy information to “update their general impressions of
Congress” (Jones and McDermott 2009, 7). This is what is known as “online processing” (Jones
and McDermott 2009, 44). Online processing allows the people to form quick opinions about a
particular policy or action of Congress to alter their general perception of the representatives and
the institution. Often, the people thereafter forget the particular details of congressional action,
but their initial opinion serves to update their overall perception of Congress. Another means for
forming opinions on policy matters is knowledge derived from social networks. Schools, places
of worship, peers and other networks enable people to internalize different opinions on varied
topics.
Indeed, the public can distinguish between clear-cut ideologies. Parties are becoming
increasingly polarized on an ideological level (Jones and McDermott 2009; Mansbridge 1997).
Ideologically, “both parties…continue to be influenced by their extremes” (Mansbridge 1997,
177). As a result, citizens’ knowledge of which party controls Congress informs them of the
general political leaning of a particular Congress. They can therefore indirectly form opinions
about the institution (Jones and McDermott 2009). The people have sufficient knowledge of
which party is in power, and it is not too much to ask of citizens to know, in general terms, the
altering major-party ideologies. Thus, incorrect answers to specific factual questions about
policy, traditionally thought to indicate public unawareness, do not “automatically indicate
political ignorance” (Jones and McDermott 2009, 38).
13

External Forces Affecting the Public’s Opinion of Congress
The media is an external force which can negatively affect the public’s approval of
Congress. As Clawson and Oxley (2008, 91) note, “the media influence what citizens think
about, what issues citizens bring to bear when evaluating candidates and officeholders, and what
considerations shape their thinking on political issues.” The media transmits stories to the
public, and often emphasizes negative aspects of individual members of Congress and the
legislative process. “Coverage of the democratic legislative process—which includes extensive
conflict, compromise, debate, cooperation, partisanship, and procedural wrangling—is frequent
in congressional news” (Morris and Clawson 2005, 298). The press is “decidedly commercial
and adversarial in its orientation” (Patterson 2000, 241). As Patterson (2000, 241) describes,
“disputes [between and among politicians] are prominently displayed” by the media. News
stories often emphasize “legislative maneuvering,” such as the use of filibusters (Morris and
Clawson 2005, 308). The news media also transmits stories on specific issues in addition to their
coverage of legislative processes. Indeed, “issue-based stories, rather than scandals and
personality driven articles, are prominent mainstays of congressional coverage” (Morris and
Clawson 2005, 298). Seventy-nine percent of the stories analyzed by Morris and Clawson
(2005) were issue-based stories. Yet, ninety-one percent of the stories they analyzed mentioned
an aspect of the legislative process. Morris and Clawson (2005, 306) note that “conflict between
political parties and between Congress and the executive branch were frequently involved in
congressional news stories.” As noted previously, conflict among representatives is cause for
public disapproval of Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 2002). Yet, “multiple
conflicts in a single story were more common than multiple compromises” (Morris and Clawson
2005, 309). The coverage of conflict by the media can foster public disapproval of Congress.
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The other main external force perpetually endangering public opinion of Congress is the
state of the economy. The effect of the economy on election outcomes will be analyzed in a
future chapter to this thesis. The public believes that Congress is economically inefficient and
wasteful. The decline in trust of government and Congress more specifically is a result of a lower
quality of life and economic health of the public (Gronke, Hicks and Cook 2010). High levels of
unemployment and periods of economic stagnation and struggle cause the public to blame
Congress (Gronke, Hicks and Cook 2010). This blame, in part, is attributable to the public’s
perception of a luxurious lifestyle and perquisites afforded to representatives. The public may
have stronger disapproval of economic inefficiency in a tougher economic environment. Thus,
the external factor of the state of the economy, in concert with inefficiency on behalf of
Congress, can increase public disapproval of the legislative branch. Economic waste is perhaps
best symbolized by the seemingly perpetual government deficit, save a few years of surplus. The
people believe that, in light of the perquisites of congressional office, it is no wonder why
Congress cannot balance the national budget. “Does the public cut Congress any slack? The
answer is basically no” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 71). One counterargument to the
citizens’ anger of the failure of Congress to balance its budget is that the public has unreasonable
expectations. Citizens are unreasonable in that they have enormous expectations about what they
want government to provide, yet don’t want to pay more in taxes to make those services
economically feasible (Orren 1997). Indeed, “governments…must propose unpopular costs in
order to produce popular benefits” (Mansbridge 1997, 134).
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Congressional Election Outcomes
The multiple dimensions of public evaluations of Congress are necessary for predicting
election outcomes (Jones and McDermott 2009). Later chapters of this thesis will evaluate the
extent to which the reasons people dislike Congress, including dislike of the members of
Congress, the legislative process, policy-output, and external forces such as the state of the
economy and the media, affect the results of elections. Congressional election outcomes are
affected by a multitude of variables. In any given election year, issues specific to that year will
shape outcomes. However, in general, six main variables—incumbency, campaign finance,
gerrymandering and its effect on party identification, national trends, the media, and the state of
the economy—affect congressional elections. It is essential to keep in mind these six variables
in analyzing congressional elections, which will be the focus of subsequent chapters of this
thesis.

The Incumbency Advantage
The single greatest factor affecting election outcomes in the presence of an incumbent, or
a candidate who currently holds office and is seeking reelection (Jacobson 1980, 1987; Krasno
1994). In 2004, 98% of Democratic incumbents and 99% of Republican incumbents in the
House of Representatives won re-election (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007). In 2006, only
0.5% of incumbents in both the House of Representatives and the Senate were defeated in the
primaries (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007). This accounts for two out of 404 incumbents
running in the House and zero out of 28 incumbents running in the Senate (Abramson, Aldrich
and Rohde 2007). In the modern era, “from 1974 through 2006, only 4 percent of House
16

incumbents who sought reelection were defeated on election day” (Jones and McDermott 2009,
114). From 1974 to 2004, incumbent Senators were reelected, on average, 84 % of the time
(Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007). Both rates are impressive, but one may ask, why is the
reelection rate for incumbents even greater in the House of Representatives than in the Senate?
Indeed, “incumbent senators are far more likely than incumbent representatives to be defeated”
in reelection (Krasno 1994, 1). One theory is that Senators enjoy more press coverage than
representatives. Although this is beneficial during economically prosperous times and when the
public is generally content, this exposure results in Senators being held more accountable during
tough times (Krasno 1994). In addition, challengers of Senate incumbents are generally better
candidates than challengers of House incumbents. “In every respect…the survey data portray
Senate challengers as more formidable candidates than their counterparts who run for the House”
(Krasno 1994, 99). In short, challengers for the Senate enjoy greater popularity and are more
qualified than challengers for the House.
Incumbency is the most important variable in determining who wins congressional
elections in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Some argue that the incumbency
advantage undermines public accountability, in that “once they become incumbents—
representatives and senators are unbeatable, free to ignore the will of the people” (Krasno 1994,
5). According to this argument, the advantages afforded incumbents outweigh the ability of the
people to simply vote them out of office (Krasno 1994). Others argue that incumbency gives
voters cues as to which candidate is more qualified, the incumbent or the challenger.
“Incumbency has replaced party as a positive cue for voters” (Jacobson 1980, 26). In the past,
voters would choose candidates in large part based on party affiliation. However, given the rise
of the popularity of incumbents after World War Two, incumbency seems to be a positive
17

qualification for candidates. Incumbents can, in effect, campaign year round, using their
accomplishments in office as evidence of their success (Jacobson 1987). This campaigning often
takes the form of advertising in the media. Incumbents advertise more often and more
effectively than do challengers (West 2010).
Incumbents are also at an advantage due to the “highly decentralized committee and
subcommittee structure [which] allows members to specialize in legislative areas where they can
best serve local interests” (Jacobson 1987, 35). Due to the institutional organization of
Congress, representatives can focus their energies on serving interests unique to their own
constituents. For example, a representative from Harlem, New York, would not bother
becoming an active member of a committee debating agricultural practices, because his/her
constituents are not directly affected by the accompanying legislation. However, that same
representative would find it helpful to become part of a subcommittee addressing urban issues, a
position that could be used to garner support from voters in that particular district. Incumbency
and working as a member of Congress allows representatives to focus on issues pertinent to their
specific constituents. “What counts is the member’s ability to deliver services, which increases
with his tenure in Washington and his consequent seniority and familiarity with the
administrative apparatus” (Jacobson 1987, 41). This experience coupled with greater popularity
and name-recognition among constituents gives incumbents an almost insurmountable advantage
in elections. The power of incumbency is unmatched as a variable for determining election
outcomes. The number of close elections involving incumbents decreased from the 1960s
through the 1980s (Jacobson 1987). However, this trend reversed in the 1990s, as “many
incumbents were subjected to vigorous competition for the first time in many years” (Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 229). Yet, “now, in the twenty-first century, competition is again at a
18

low point, largely due to the deliberate crafting of safe districts for both parties’ incumbents”
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 229). Overall, the lack of serious competition further
exemplifies the far-reaching influence of incumbency.
In addition, incumbency is an advantage because of greater donations to campaigns from
interest groups than those enjoyed by challengers. Interest groups are more likely to donate to
incumbents than to their challengers (Jacobson 1987). This is a function of the desire to
influence legislative outcomes on behalf of special interests. Interest groups are more likely to
fund incumbents’ campaigns than those of challengers because the mid-ninety percent reelection
rate of incumbents ensures that interest groups will be more likely to garner influence with those
in office. Even though special interests are an important source of campaign funds, “generally,
about two-thirds of all campaign money comes from private individuals” (Jacobson 1980, 56).
Therefore, candidate recognition is an important variable in raising campaign funds.
Incumbents, since they are more widely known than challengers, in general enjoy more
donations from private individuals than do challengers. Incumbency also offers candidates preelection exposure through their previous tenure in office. Therefore, incumbents, all else being
equal, do not have to spend as much money as do challengers to receive recognition as a viable
candidate (Jacobson 1987). Gary C. Jacobson (1987) expresses the difficulty of challenging an
incumbent member of Congress. Challengers are only successful when both that challenger is
“vigorous” and the incumbent is unpopular (Jacobson 1987, 134). In addition, “winning
challengers are much better known by voters” than losing challengers (Jacobson 1987, 134).
Thus, a successful challenge to an incumbent most probably necessitates a forceful, popular, and
well-known challenger along with an unpopular incumbent.
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Campaign Finance
Trends in campaign finance are also determining factors in election outcomes. Tip
O’Neill, former Speaker of the House once stated “there are four parts to any campaign. The
candidate, the issues of the candidate, the campaign organization, and the money to run the
campaign with. Without money you can forget the other three” (Jacobson 1980, 33). Money is
not a sufficient, but is most definitely a necessary condition, for successful campaigns (Jacobson
1980). “Challengers raise the least amount of money and find it difficult to win, no matter what
they spend” (Jacobson 1987, 50). From 1972 to 1984, any challenger who spent less than
$100,000 was not competitive in their election. Challengers were only competitive, defined as
having at least a one in four chance of winning, once they spent $250,000 (Jacobson 1987). In
2004, challengers spent an average of $269,000, while incumbents spent on average slightly
greater than $1 million, which “yielded an increased incumbent-to-challenger ratio of 3.85 to 1”
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 230). Thus, an extremely large amount of money is
needed to run a viable campaign, and even more is needed if one is running as a challenger to a
seated incumbent.
A recent controversy on the topic of campaign spending was a January 2010 Supreme
Court ruling that the government could not ban campaign donations from corporations. 1 In
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5 to 4 split decision deemed that banning
corporate spending on political campaigns was a violation of the First Amendment right of free
speech. This ruling represents an ideological shift in that the court previously ruled that
corporations, in large part, do not enjoy the same political rights as individuals. This ruling
overruled the precedent set in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, more commonly
1
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known as the McCain-Feingold Act, which limited campaign donations and advertisements
supporting a party or candidate from corporations leading up to an election. 2 The McCainFeingold Act had previously banned ‘soft money,’ or “unlimited donations from corporations,
unions, and wealthy individuals supposedly for party-building activities and not directly linked
to the election of individual candidates” (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007, 231). The ruling
in Citizens United has the potential for major implications regarding campaign finance, as there
may be a large influx of corporate donations to specific candidates, who it is feared would
thereafter legislate in such a way as to benefit those corporations. A ninety-page dissent argues
that speech by a corporation should not be conflated with human speech. 3 The Citizens United
case exemplifies the potential importance of campaign finance for congressional elections.

Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering and the redrawing of congressional district lines also impact elections.
Gerrymandering is a cause for political upheaval, debate, and public condemnation by the party
negatively affected by the redrawing of district lines. Every ten years after the census,
congressional district boundaries are re-drawn to account for shifts in the population. Thus, a
state can gain or lose seats in the House of Representatives, the number of which has been fixed
at 435 representatives since the 1910 census (Jacobson 1987). Gerrymandering is the process by
which congressional districts are redrawn, often by the majority party in state legislatures, to
“maximize the number of seats the party can win, given the number and distribution of its usual
voters” (Jacobson 1987, 12). As Jacobson (1987, 12) explains:
2
3
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The idea is to concentrate the opposing party’s voters in a small number of districts
which that party can win by large margins, thus ‘wasting’ many of its votes, and to create
as many districts as possible where their own party has a secure, though not
overwhelming, majority.
One example of gerrymandering occurred in 1980 by the Republican party in Indiana
(Jacobson 1987, 13). Republicans, with the explicit intent to hurt the Democrats in future
elections, “produced one new district that contained the homes of three Democratic incumbents.
Two Democrats had their districts chopped up and redistributed to four new districts” (Jacobson
1987, 13). Redistricting also served to the Republicans’ advantage in the 1996 elections, as more
Republican state governors were elected in 1994. In addition, “new district lines were drawn for
Florida, Louisiana, and Texas before the November 1996 elections” following a series of
Supreme Court rulings declaring the redrawing of district lines in these states after the 1990
census unconstitutional (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 205). Republican governors were
able to institute and maintain majority Latino districts (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999).
Maintenance of these “majority minority districts,” a classic example of gerrymandering,
allowed the Republican party to undermine the traditional Democratic stronghold of the Latino
vote (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999, 204). In effect, redistricting in this example,
“disrupted [the] established patterns of political support” of the Democratic party (Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde 1999, 204).
The effectiveness of gerrymandering is a result of the existence of voting blocks.
Homogeneous groups tend to support particular political parties as a cohesive unit. For example,
low-income voters tend to vote for the Democratic party (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999).
Redistricting in this fashion sparked controversy, culminating in the 1995 Supreme Court ruling
in Miller v. Johnson, which “declared Georgia’s redistricting plan unconstitutional because it had
responded to the Justice Department’s pressure to create three majority-minority districts without
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constitutional justification” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999, 205). Previously, in 1993, the
Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno “expressed concern about ‘bizarrely-shaped’ districts that had
been drawn for racial purposes…[and thus] could violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999, 205).
Party identification, which is reinforced on the community level by gerrymandering,
affects election outcomes, particularly in the House of Representatives. Gerrymandering yields
stronger individual ties to one political party. Those within a district redrawn to be a safe haven
for one of the major political parties will more strongly identify with that party as the district will
most likely be comprised of like-minded voters. “Voters who [are] willing to label themselves
Democrats or Republicans [identify] with the party in the same way they might identify with a
region or an ethnic or religious group: ‘I’m a Texan, a Baptist, and a Democrat’” (Jacobson
1987, 104). The process of gerrymandering groups together like-minded citizens who vote for
the same party, reinforcing their party affiliation over time. For these voters, party affiliation is a
“shorthand” way to simplify voting decisions (Jacobson 1987, 105). For example, much of the
electorate in 2000 voted along partisan lines in the congressional elections as well as the
presidential election. Indeed, “party identification has a significant effect on voters’ decisions”
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2003, 243). Thus the effect of gerrymandering to reinforce party
identification has the potential to impact congressional election outcomes.

National Trends
Congressional elections are “highly sensitive to national issues” (Jacobson 1987, 139).
One dominating national trend in Congress in the 1990s was the Republican majority from 1994
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to 2006. The 1994 election was known as the Republican Revolution. Newly elected House
Speaker Newt Gingrich and the Republican “Contract with America” gained the support of the
American public. The result of the emergence of Speaker Gingrich and the conservative tide was
that the Republicans were able to take away the “backbone” of the Democrats in 1996, thus
reassuring their control of Congress (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999, 203). Although the
Republican Revolution was considered historic, divisions in the Republican party developed,
causing House Speaker Newt Gingrich to resign in 1998. Thus began the fall of the Republican
party after the highest of highs (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1999). A case study of the 1994
midterms will be studying in greater detail in future chapters of this thesis. President Clinton,
noting the divisions within the Republican party developing by 1996, championed a more
moderate agenda as the Republican Revolution became too extreme for the public (Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde 1999). The Republicans’ triumph was short-lived, as evidenced by the
party’s inability to concretize their hold on Congress in 1996 and 1998. The national trend
benefitting the Republican party continued in 2002. The maintenance of control of Congress by
the Republicans in 2002 was more a factor of high approval ratings for the way in which the
Bush administration handled the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The focus on national
security hurt the Democratic party in 2002, as it was perceived to be soft on terrorism. This was
a strong issue-based concern of the public. National security was indeed the biggest issue in the
2002 election cycle. The public thought that the Republican party had a clearer plan for the
country pertaining to national security (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2003).
The 2004 election cycle symbolizes the importance of individuals’ political preferences
on voting, as Jones and McDermott (2009) hypothesize. In 2004, the liberal-conservative scale
impacted the congressional election. That year, voters seemed to be particularly “affected by
24

their perceptions of where candidates [stood] on the issues” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde
2007, 255). Indeed, 92% of voters who self-identified as a “Strong Democrat” voted for the
Democratic party candidate for the House of Representatives (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde
2007, 257). This comparatively high percentage, the highest such percentage since 1966 save
the 2002 election, indicates a strong level of party identification among voters (Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde 2007).
In 2006, the Democrats regained control of both chambers of Congress, for the first time
since 1994. “The number of seats that shifted between the two parties in 2006 was [the largest]
in both chambers…in over a decade” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 265). Part of the
reason for this shift was a greater number of competitive Republican districts in 2006 than in
prior elections. Republican districts were more competitive overall than Democratic districts
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007). The Republicans’ loss of the majority was also in part
due to the fragile state of the economy in 2006. Beginning in 2006, the economy resurfaced as
an issue of paramount importance. The Republican party couldn’t emphasize its work on the
economy because of its fluctuation throughout the election year (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde
2007). Rather, the Republicans continued to emphasize national security through the media, led
by the vocal White House political strategist Karl Rove. However, support for the Iraqi conflict
had waned by the 2006 midterm elections. A shift in national focus from national security to the
economy had occurred. One Gallup poll in October of 2006 “indicated that 55 percent of
respondents said that the situation in Iraq was ‘out of control’” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde
2007, 273). Thus, the Republican strategy for winning the election and their collective policy
agenda failed to garner support from the electorate due to a shift in what the public deemed most
important, and therefore a shift in national trends. Another poll by Gallup noted that “only 23
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percent of respondents approved of the job Congress was doing, which was the same level of
approval the public registered just before the GOP takeover of Congress in 1994” (Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 275). An additional issue that hurt the Republican party was the lack
of a unified message on immigration (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007). Without a coherent
party platform, the public viewed the Republicans as unable to solve this growing problem. A
Pew Research Poll in October of 2006 indicated that “41 percent of respondents believed that
this Congress had accomplished less than usual, whereas only 6 percent thought they had done
more” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2007, 275). Thus, the polling figures demonstrate that the
Republican Revolution of 1994 was officially over in 2006. The national trend of Republican
party dominance of Congress had subsided. The 2006 election cycle also began three straight
elections in which the party holding control of Congress or the presidency changed. In 2006, the
Democrats gained a majority in both houses of Congress for the first time in twelve years. In
2008, Democratic President Barack Obama assumed office after Republican President George
W. Bush. In 2010, the Republican party regained control of the House of Representatives. This
pattern of elections for which the majority party was replaced is an ongoing and developing trend
in national elections that may well impact future congressional elections.

The Media and Congressional Elections
The media strongly influences voters’ perceptions of the issues, of candidates, and thus of
elections in general. The media transmits evaluations of members of Congress (Arnold 2004).
Incumbents’ prospects for re-election are often linked to what the voters are exposed to in the
media, including personal scandals (Arnold 2004). According to Douglas Arnold (2004), the
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media transmits four useful types of information to the public, which uses this information to
form opinions about members of Congress, the institution itself, and policy output. First, the
media informs the public of the positions taken by members of Congress on various issues.
More popular and the best-known legislators, as well as those who publicly sponsor legislation,
will receive greater media coverage than an unknown congressperson. Second, the media
conveys how individual legislators have been innovative in the legislative process. The people,
who can identify many problems, would rather a representative be innovative than be consumed
by party-politics as usual. Innovation, as long as it is not destructive to the whole nor offends the
people, is welcomed by the public as evidence of active problem solving. Thirdly, the media
offers information relating to how other officials, media personalities, and citizens evaluate an
individual legislator. People often form opinions about a representative based on their popularity
among other groups. Politicians considered widely popular and conveyed as such in the media
are more likely to receive high praise from the public than an unknown representative or one
portrayed in a negative fashion. Finally, the media informs citizens of who is running for
political office and describes their personal characteristics and political platforms. This
information is useful throughout election season, during which the people obtain a great majority
of their information about candidates from the media. Rarely do the people gather such
knowledge from personal interactions with a candidate or word of mouth. The broadcasting of
these four categories of information allows the people to acquire knowledge about a legislator
that they otherwise would not gather were it not for the media.
Candidates running for office use the media to portray themselves and opponents in the
best way as to ensure election (Arnold 2004). The adversarial system, whereby candidates
highlight their own successes and emphasize their opponents’ shortcomings may yield the truth
27

about a candidate’s performance. This information, once publicized, allows the people to make
informed decisions while voting. Throughout campaigns candidates utilize political
advertisements as a means of mobilizing the voting population. One downside to politicians’ use
of the media in this regard is that the people disapprove of negative campaigning, which has
become a staple of contemporary elections (Orren 1997). The advent of television and the
Internet has inundated the public with negative messages about candidates, which the public
finds distasteful. The media can explicitly question a legislator or candidate on how they intend
to vote on an upcoming and important issue (Arnold 2004). This information is targeted and
useful for those issues that dominate the news cycle, and thus the psyche of the people. Rich
coverage of the issues yields higher awareness among the electorate (Arnold 2004). The role of
the media has evolved over time. Since the 1950s, the media has changed from “narrator to
actor” (Orren 1997, 96). Before the mid-twentieth century, the press simply relayed information
to the public. However, the press has enhanced its role to include debate of the issues, grading
representatives, and adding journalists’ own opinions about the issues. As a result, public
knowledge of the most important contemporary issues during the election season and of the
candidates running in an election has widened.

State of the Economy
The general state of the economy is a continual variable in congressional elections.
Midterm elections are in part a referendum on the “performance of the president and his handling
of the economy” (Jacobson 1980, 28). Negative associations with the president in general, and
more specifically with his handling of the economy, yield higher turnout among those who will
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vote against the president’s party (Jacobson 1980). A salient issue in the 2002 election cycle was
the economy, which was perceived to be performing poorly. The poor economy was blamed on
the presidency of George W. Bush and the Republican-controlled Congress (Abramson, Aldrich
and Rohde 2003). Some posit that the Republicans were able to maintain a majority in Congress
in 2002 because of a public relations campaign by Bush showing that he cared about the
economy (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2003). Given the fact that Congress controls much of
the economy through a federal budget, the people expect Congress to safeguard against tough
economic times. This is true even for economic episodes outside of the direct control of
Congress. According to a Gallup poll from February of 2009, 64% of respondents favor
government “aid to homeowners who are in danger of losing their homes to foreclosure”
(Newport 2009). In addition, 83% of respondents favored government funding for programs to
create new jobs (Newport 2009). This expectation of governmental aid for downtrodden people
during tough economic times could be linked to the memory of federal action under President
Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression. Although individuals differ in what they
deem to be the appropriate level of governmental safeguarding of the economy, most agree that
the government has some duty in “providing economic security” (Yeric and Todd 1983, 67). In
a related matter, public trust in government is in part dependent upon the economic health of the
nation, demonstrating the power of the economy over the mindset of the people (Clawson and
Oxley 2008).
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Conclusion
Public opinion of Congress has been consistently poor over the past fifty years.
Historically, Congress was revered as the most powerful legislature in the world. However, over
the last half-century, public opinion of Congress has fallen to dismal levels. Our legislative
branch, created by the first article of the Constitution, has fallen from the most powerful branch
of government, to arguably the least. Public disapproval of Congress stems from disapproval of
the representatives in Congress, poor regard for the legislative process, popular disagreement
over policy output, dislike of Congress as an institution, and external forces such as the media
and the economy which damage the prestige of Congress and its members.
Congressional elections in general have followed consistent trends over the past few
decades. Incumbency is the single most important factor in determining election outcomes, and
incumbents’ reelection rate in both houses of Congress is within the mid-ninety percent range.
Campaign finance also affects election outcomes, as elections cost hundreds of thousands if not
millions of dollars to fund, and there are ongoing disputes about whom and what organizations
can make donations. Redrawing district lines and gerrymandering directly impact congressional
elections. Gerrymandering has the distinctive effect of intensifying party identification, and both
have implications on congressional elections. National trends dominate congressional elections,
such as which issues are paramount in importance at a given time and which of the two major
parties have more influence. The media influences congressional elections in that its “narrator”
role serves to inform the public of, and persuade the people about, the most important issues
(Orren 1997). Finally, the state of the economy affects every election cycle, as a poor economy
will serve as a catalyst for a negative reaction to the majority party.
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Later chapters of this thesis will determine if there is a connection between public
approval of Congress and congressional elections. The goal of this chapter was to review the
existing literature on public disapproval of Congress and congressional elections in more general
terms. Chapter Two will highlight my own hypotheses about a link between public approval of
Congress and congressional election outcomes. Subsequent chapters will focus on testing the
hypotheses formed in Chapter Two, initially through appropriate data analysis. In addition, a
closer look at the elections of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010 will provide the opportunity to test my
theories about the role of public approval of Congress in midterm election outcomes. I chose to
focus on midterm elections because those years in which the President of the United States is
elected, the public is preoccupied with the candidates and campaign for the role of chief
executive. Midterm elections allow for the highlighting of Congress away from the importance
of a presidential election. It is my hope that a link between public approval of Congress and
congressional election outcomes is uncovered to broaden the scope of knowledge in the area.
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Chapter Two
The Link Between Public Disapproval of Congress and Congressional Elections

An essential step in exploring whether or not public disapproval of Congress impacts
congressional elections is to determine under what circumstances such a relationship would
manifest itself. The key question of this chapter is when is it especially likely that public
disapproval of Congress impacts congressional elections? The high incumbency reelection rate
and the ever-low approval rating of Congress as an institution might lead one to conclude that
public disapproval of Congress in fact does not negatively impact congressional elections. One
would expect low approval ratings to steadily and negatively impact the reelection of
incumbents. Yet, in both houses, incumbents enjoy a mid-ninety percent reelection rate. Thus, it
is not simply public disapproval of Congress that leads to majority party turnover. Rather,
specific issues to each election cycle which inform public opinion have the potential to cause
incumbents to lose their seats. In this chapter, I posit that specific temporary and pressing issues
have the power to inform a person’s choice of candidate and mobilize the voting population to a
higher degree than if these issues weren’t urgent. The low public approval of Congress is thus
combined with these pressing issues to negatively impact incumbents’ chances of reelection. I
believe that the overlap between the factors leading to low public approval of Congress and the
variables impacting all congressional elections, analyzed in Chapter One, is essential to
explaining the negative impact of specific issues pertinent to an election cycle on reelection
rates. During those cycles when these issues serve as a particularly strong mobilizing force,
public disapproval of Congress has a greater potential to significantly impact congressional
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elections. For example, the economy, when particularly potent in its influence over voters, has
the potential to disrupt the incumbency advantage. In addition, midterm elections can serve as a
grading of the president. If the people believe the president isn’t living up to their expectations,
they are more likely to oust the president’s party during the midterm congressional elections.
Low approval regarding these issues has a greater effect on reelection rates than does static
disapproval. Other, more pressing issues, such as a newfound disenchantment with “big
government” leading to the emergence of the “Republican Revolution” in 1994 and national
security in 2002, have the potential to considerably impact voters’ decisions, and may outweigh
issues not deemed as urgent. As is the case in 2002, these external issues may not have a
negative impact if they do not intensify low approval ratings of Congress. Yet, exploring these
issues can give insight into when it is particularly likely that public disapproval of Congress
impacts congressional elections. During this study, I will focus on midterm election cycles in
that I believe the preeminence of a presidential election during applicable years trumps all other
issues. Thus, determining which factors influence congressional elections specifically is best
done by analyzing midterm elections, for which the distraction of a concurrent presidential
election is a non-issue.
Analyzing Figure 2.1, reproduced below, comparing incumbent reelection rates and
levels of public disapproval of Congress for each congressional election year confirms that a
relationship between the two variables exists. I obtained the percentage for public disapproval of
Congress from the Gallup organization, which has tracked the rates of approval and disapproval
of Congress. The question posed to respondents is, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way
Congress is handling its job” (Gallup 2011a)? Respondents answer either “Approve,”
“Disapprove,” or “No Opinion.” This data from Gallup dates from 1974 and omits the 1984
33

election year, but regardless provides ample evidence of a relationship. In the graph, I included
only reelection rates of the House of Representatives in that I believe election outcomes in the
House are more likely to be impacted by public opinion than in the Senate. In addition, I
excluded losses in primaries, as I believe the incumbency advantage is most pronounced when
the incumbent runs in the general election. For those years when public disapproval was
relatively low, incumbent reelection rates were higher than in those years when public
disapproval of Congress was relatively high. In other words, when the public was more likely to
approve of government, incumbents were more successful in their reelection bids. The
pronounced opposite dip between the two variables from 1992 to 2010 is the most convincing
evidence for a relationship between public disapproval of Congress and incumbent reelection
rates. A negative correlation between disapproval of Congress and incumbent reelection rates,
which is visible in the following graph, demonstrates that public approval levels of Congress
most probably in some manner impact elections. In the remainder of this chapter, I put forth a
few hypotheses to further explore this relationship.
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The Economy
The economy influences both public disapproval of Congress and congressional elections
in general. There is perhaps no greater factor contributing to public disapproval of Congress
than a poor economy. I hypothesize that an especially weak economy will more likely upset the
status quo than a stable economy. I hold that members of the public will be more likely to vote
against the majority party in Congress if it is perceived that their personal economic prospects
are worsening. The public holds Congress responsible for many of the problems facing the
nation, including the economy. If the people believe that a majority in Congress is not working
toward, or is ineffective in fixing the economy, I argue that they will be more likely to oust that
majority party from Congress. Incumbent reelection rates would thus decline under these
circumstances. I believe that if the people deem their economic standing to be threatened, they
will be more likely to oust sitting members of Congress than if they feel their economic position
is protected. It is widely believed that the economy was one of the major reasons the Democratic
party lost control of the House of Representatives in 2010. Unemployment “declined from 8.8%
at the end of November – down from 9.2% in mid-November, and 9.4 % at the end of October”
(Jacobe 2010a). Although unemployment, a key statistic the public is aware of when
determining the overall economic health of the country, is beginning to fall, the 9.4% rate
leading up to the November 2nd election most probably hurt the Democratic party, which held the
majority in both houses of Congress. Unemployment has the potential to impact all sectors of
the economy, and I argue that the people become worried with the onset of widespread
unemployment. In 2010, rising unemployment rates, combined with the recent banking crisis
and the mortgage crisis, negatively impacted the public’s confidence in the economy (Jacobe
2010b). I hypothesize that the 18% approval rating of Congress measured by Gallup in
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September of 2010 was due in part to a poor economy (Saad 2010b). Thus, the low approval
rating of Congress, a staple of modern politics, became relevant in the majority party turnover in
2010 partly due to the worsening health of the overall economy. I posit that disapproval of
Congress became pertinent to the election outcome in 2010 once the state of the economy
became an urgent issue.

The Emergence of Pressing Issues
Although the economy may be the most important issue to have the potential to upset the
incumbency advantage, specific contemporary issues have the ability to trump the economy. In
2002, the country was again suffering from a poor economy, and according to my hypothesis
above, the majority party, the Republican party in 2002, should have been vulnerable to seat
losses. Frank Newport, in an article for Gallup in 2002, reported that “consumer confidence and
optimism about the national economy [were] at low levels” (Newport 2002). However, I believe
that one particular issue, national security, superseded the state of the economy as the most
important issue to the public. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, one of the
nation’s top concerns was national security. The Republican party, despite a fluctuating
economy, held on to the majority due to a more consistent platform for dealing with national
security (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2003). The poor economy was largely blamed on
President Bush and the Republican-controlled Congress. Yet, the Republicans’ clearer plan for
national security, in comparison with that of the Democratic party, saved the Republican
majority in the 2002 elections. This clear plan combined with high regard for the way in which
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President Bush responded to the terrorist attacks enabled the Republican party to sidestep the
potentially damaging effects of a poor economy on maintaining a majority.
For the election cycles since the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, national security has been a
steadily declining issue in terms of the importance placed on it by the public. Immediately after
9/11, 46% of Americans polled named terrorism at the nation’s top issue (Newport 2010). In the
nine years since, terrorism and national security has become less urgent an issue from the
perspective of the American public in general. In January of 2010, Gallup reported that “1% of
Americans [mentioned] terrorism as the most important problem facing the country” (Newport
2010). I posit that national security was the most important issue for the 2002 election cycle, but
has since become less of an issue, especially in comparison with the economy, which the public
has found increasingly important (Newport 2010). In the most recent election cycle, national
security ranked behind jobs, the budget deficit, healthcare, and taxes as issues the public deemed
crucial for Congress to address in 2011, according to a Reuters poll (PollingReport.com 2010)
conducted in October and November of 2010. These four broad issues are all economic in nature
or have economic implications, in the case of healthcare. Thus, it seems that national security,
an issue of great importance to the public in the immediate years after September 11th, has
become relatively less urgent an issue to the American public. To be sure, national security is
still an important and multi-faceted issue, considering problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, North
Korea, Iran, Israel and the Palestinian territories, and the Wikileaks scandals. Yet, for the
American public, the economy has emerged as the most pressing issue. The reemergence of the
economy as an issue of paramount importance illustrates the relative significance of national
security for the 2002 election, regardless of its short shelf-life as the most important issue.
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The impact of urgent issues is also evidenced, I argue, by the outcome of the 1994
midterm elections. John R. Hibbing and Eric Tiritilli (2000) argue that in 1994 public
disapproval of Congress indeed did impact the election. The “Republican Revolution” that
resulted was the product of the emergence of Newt Gingrich and the “Contract with America.”
Although not one specific issue, leading up to the 1994 elections, a conservative tide swept the
United States under the leadership of future House Speaker Gingrich. Neither the economy nor
negative evaluations of the president can explain the change in majority party control since
“economic conditions were quite strong and the Democratic president’s popularity was not all
that low” (Hibbing and Tiritilli 2000, 117). Yet, I posit that a newly emerging dissatisfaction
with “big government,” as well as the Democratic party and its perceived more liberal agenda
became the most pressing issue for the 1994 election. This issue mobilized the public and
supplemented low approval ratings of Congress to lead to a majority party turnover.
Knowledge of the political parties was particularly high among members of the public in
1994, and party identification is central to this example. During that year, three out of four
citizens, when asked, were able to state that the Democratic party held the majority in Congress
(Hibbing and Tiritilli 2000, 112). Hibbing and Tiritilli (2000, 115) argue that the case of 1994
was special because of the “public’s willingness to attribute responsibility for the problems of
Congress to the majority party, and, then, to vote on the basis of that attribution.” The midterm
vote of 1994 is an example of how an emerging issue can become paramount in an election and
affect its outcome. I hypothesize that the performance of the Democratic party, in 1994, became
a more pressing issue than in other years. The issue was spurred by the emergence of a
grassroots movement backed by a popular Republican platform and leadership core, and thus
negatively impacted Democratic incumbents’ chances for reelection. Newt Gingrich was the key
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to the majority party turnover as he successfully characterized the performance of the
Democratic party as a pressing issue. Gingrich led the “enthusiastically aggressive minority
party leadership” in denouncing the majority party to the extent of making it an urgent issue from
a popular perspective. To achieve this end, Gingrich emphasized process concerns of the public,
namely that Congress under Democratic leadership was too large and cumbersome. This echoes
the argument put forth by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 2002), that process concerns on
behalf of the public can lead to lower approval ratings of Congress. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
(1995, 2002) argue that the public disapproves of the way in which Congress goes about its
business. Inefficiency, fear of corruption, compromise, and the slow grind that is modern
congressional politics draw the ire of the public. Thus, process concerns, or public disapproval
of the workings of Congress, negatively impacts public opinion of and confidence in the
institution (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 2002). In 1994, Gingrich seized upon this source of
public disapproval to mobilize the public against the Democratic majority.

Midterm Elections as a Referendum on the President
Midterm elections often serve as a referendum on the performance, or perceived
performance by the public, of the president. I argue that a particularly polarizing officeholder of
the presidency has the potential to negatively impact public opinion, as well as the reelection
rates of incumbents if they are of the same political party as the president. If the president’s
party holds a majority in Congress, that majority would thus be threatened. For example, I
believe that the majority party turnover in 2010 was due in part to, along with a poor economy,
negative reactions to the Obama administration. President Obama successfully mobilized voters
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during his campaign, but the practical means of doing business in Washington, characterized by
compromise, debate, and strong partisanship, do not match Obama’s campaign rhetoric. The
president’s rhetoric was characterized by bipartisanship, compromise, transparency, and change.
President Obama ran on such a platform, but has been unable to satisfy the desire of the public to
change politics as usual. For example, President Obama pledged to close the prison at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, yet has to this date failed to do so due to political obstacles. Many of
his supporters disfavored the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but President Obama has increased
the number of troops in combat in Afghanistan and remains loyal to the cause in Iraq. In
addition, he has continued the Bush-era practice of drone attacks in Afghanistan and has
currently forged a compromise with Republican leadership to extend the Bush-era tax cuts. Part
of the reason I hold that Obama has failed to meet expectations is that the media inflated public
expectations of the president. Media coverage was so positive of the energizing young Senator
during the campaign that the public most probably expected too much of President Obama.
A referendum on the job performance of the president, which has implications for
midterm elections, can also have positive effects on incumbent reelection. I believe that the
performance of the economy impacts public evaluations of those in power, including the
president. I argue that a poor economy will lead to negative evaluations, and a healthy economy
to positive evaluations, of officeholders. In 1998, the economy was performing “remarkably
well” which bolstered the approval ratings of Democratic President Bill Clinton as well as the
Republican majority in Congress (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 254). Were it not for a
prosperous economy, I hypothesize that the 1998 election cycle outcomes would have been
worse for the Democratic party as backlash to President Clinton. Although Clinton was not up
for reelection in 1998, the prosperous economy helped to downplay the Monica Lewinsky
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scandal. Many believed that “the president’s sex scandal would finally damage his standing with
the public, and that the negative reaction would spill over to his party in the congressional
elections” (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 254). However, that negative reaction never
manifested itself. I believe that the maintenance of Clinton’s high approval rating was due in
part to a successful economy. Thus, the public’s assessment of the Clinton presidency was more
impacted by the healthy economy than by the personal scandal. The Democratic party was
therefore not the victim of a negative assessment of President Clinton in 1998, which was
surprisingly nonexistent. Rather, the Democratic party was saved further seat losses by a
thriving economy.

Conclusion
The hypotheses laid out above can be tested by examining election outcomes and the
general political environment during the election cycles of 2010, 1998, 2002, and 1994. “Two
factors that previous analyses of congressional elections have generally shown to have an
important impact on outcomes are the economy and evaluations of the president” (Abramson,
Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 255). I posit that low approval ratings of Congress along with the
economy and evaluations of the president, as they become pressing issues, can negatively impact
incumbents’ reelection rates. For example, I believe that the most pressing issue in 2010 was the
economy, which, combined with a low approval rating of President Obama and low approval
ratings of Congress, led to the loss of a majority in the House of Representatives for the
Democratic party. The power of the economy is also evidenced by the positive impact of the
economy on the approval ratings of President Bill Clinton in 1998, which protected the
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Democratic minority in Congress from potential backlash from the president’s personal scandals.
Public disapproval of Congress is primed to have an effect on elections when the economy and
the performance of the president are at the forefront of public awareness. Additional factors can
outweigh the economy and the president’s performance in their impact on congressional
elections. For example, national security, I believe, was the most important issue in the 2002
elections, as evidenced by the maintenance of the Republican majority in spite of an unsettling
economy. In addition, the emerging issue of the size and direction of the government,
popularized by Newt Gingrich and the “Contract with America” in 1994, negatively impacted
Democratic incumbents’ prospects for reelection. Although not a single issue, the “Contract
with America,” in concert with low approval of Congress, mobilized the people to oust the
majority party. In all, the economy, the performance of the president, and newly emerging
pressing issues all have the potential to combine with low approval ratings of Congress to impact
congressional elections. A closer look at these issues, utilizing the cases of 2010, 2002, 1998,
and 1994, can serve to test these hypotheses. Doing so will test whether these three issues have
the potential to combine with and/or augment low approval ratings of Congress to disrupt the
incumbency advantage and precipitate majority party turnover.

43

Chapter Three
The Economy, Public Approval of Congress, and Incumbent Reelection Rates

In this chapter, I focus on what I believe to be the effect of the economy on both public
approval of Congress and the incumbent reelection rate. As previously noted, the incumbent rate
for members of Congress has remained in the mid-ninety percent range since World War Two,
with few exceptions (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, 2003, 2007). I hypothesize that a
poorly performing economy has the potential to negatively impact incumbent reelection rates by
combining with the already low public approval rating of Congress to yield a level of
dissatisfaction unacceptable to the public. As a result, the people will be more likely to oust
incumbents than if the economy was performing well or was not perceived to be an urgent issue.
The effect of the economy on incumbent reelection rates is most pronounced when the people
perceive the economy to be among the most pressing of issues.
Two types of data can be utilized to test the potential effect of the economy on voters’
willingness to oust sitting incumbents. Unemployment is one of the most well known statistics
that the public uses in forming opinions about the state of the economy. I hypothesize that high
unemployment will correspond with low incumbent reelection rates. The other statistic to test
the viability of the economy as an indicator of public voting patterns is consumer sentiment. I
posit that low levels of consumer sentiment will precipitate high turnover and relatively low
incumbent reelection rates. Graphing these data alongside incumbent reelection rates will
illustrate a correlation, if one exists. In addition, graphing public approval levels of Congress
will show if the state of the economy and the people’s perception of Congress are correlated.
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Should a correlation surface, one could more convincingly make the case for the potential of the
economy to upset the incumbent advantage.

Unemployment
Figure 3.1, reproduced below, is a graph of incumbent reelection rates compared with the
unemployment rate, as well as consumer sentiment and public approval of Congress. However, I
am devoting this section to the potential impact of unemployment levels on congressional
election outcomes. I believe that levels of unemployment are a sufficiently public issue to arouse
the angst of the public during times of economic downturn. Unemployment is a widely reported
statistic and significantly affects individuals’ perceptions of the state of the economy. The data
for incumbent reelection rates was gathered from the Gallup organization, and the
unemployment rate for each of the election years from 1974 to 2010 was gathered from the
United States Bureau of Labor (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Instead of plotting
unemployment rates, I plotted employment rates by subtracting the unemployment rate from one
hundred so as to make the graph more visually appealing in that the employment line would
track with the reelection rate. If my hypothesis is correct, in certain election years when the
percentage of adults employed was relatively low, thus indicating high unemployment,
incumbent reelection rates would be lower than usual. Unfortunately, I found that my graph is
not completely convincing of such a correlation. There are certain years, for example 2010, for
which low employment levels and a low incumbent reelection rate coexist. In 2010, the
unemployment rate was a high 9.7%, coinciding with a low incumbent reelection rate of 87%.
Thus, it seems that high unemployment played a part in undermining the incumbency advantage.
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Likewise, in 1982, a relatively low employment rate of 90.3%, translating into a 9.7%
unemployment rate corresponded with a low 90.1% incumbent reelection rate for that election
cycle. Yet, such correlations are not universal for the data set. For example in 1974, the
unemployment rate was a reasonable 5.6%. Yet, in that same election year, only 87.7% of
incumbents were reelected. The lack of a strong correlation could be explained by the opinion
that there were years when the economy was not the most pressing issue. Perhaps other issues
trumped the economy, which speaks to my hypothesis that topical issues have the potential to
dominate an election cycle.
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Figure 3.1- Incumbency, Unemployment, Public Approval of Congress, and Consumer Sentiment
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I did not find a particularly convincing correlation between unemployment and public
approval levels of Congress either. It seems that public disapproval of Congress is impacted not
by unemployment, but by other issues. Midterm evaluations of presidents and topical issues, two
additional variables I will be analyzing in future chapters of this thesis, hopefully will provide
more examples as to why public approval levels have fluctuated. Although unemployment was
not a fruitful avenue of research, graphing incumbent reelection rates with consumer confidence
could further test my hypothesis that a poorly performing economy, or the perception of such,
negatively affects incumbent reelection rates.

Consumer Sentiment
Although the unemployment rate did not prove to be a reliable variable impacting
incumbent reelection rates, consumer sentiment may prove to be a more productive avenue for
exploring the effect of the economy on the incumbent reelection rate. Consumer sentiment may
be a more accurate reflection of how the voters will respond to the state of the economy. Figure
3.2, reproduced below, is a graph from the University of Michigan which plots consumer
sentiment, while noting those periods in United States history of economic recession (Economic
Research: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2011). Sentiment indexes are “constructed from
answers to survey questions” posed to the general public (Desroches and Gosselin 2004, 942). It
is believed that levels of consumer sentiment and confidence are linked to “employment and
financial conditions” (Desroches and Gosselin 2004, 942). Thus, if consumer sentiment is low,
the people are more likely to find their economic prospects unacceptable. As per my hypothesis,
if consumer sentiment is low, the people will be more likely to vote out incumbent
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representatives as consumer sentiment will negatively impact the public’s approval of Congress.
I included the consumer sentiment index derived from Figure 3.2 for each year in Figure 3.1. A
correlation between consumer sentiment and incumbent reelection rates is evident. During the
recession leading up to the 2010 midterm elections, consumer sentiment was low, with a rating
of 71.6. Figure 3.1 shows that incumbent representatives fared worse off than usual during the
2010 midterms, with only 87% reelected. In addition, incumbency reelection was a relatively
low 90.1% in 1982, as seen in Figure 3.1. In 1982, consumer sentiment toward the economy was
at another low point, achieving an index of 68. In 2004 and 2006, the incumbent reelection rates
were 97.8% and 94.0%, respectively. In the time between those election years, consumer
sentiment dropped from 95.2 in 2004 to 87.3 in 2006. Conversely, in 1996 the incumbent
reelection rate was 94%, while two years later the incumbent reelection rate was 98.3%. In 1996
and 1998, the consumer sentiment index achieved a score of 93.6 and 104.6, respectively.
Admittedly, the correlation between consumer sentiment and incumbent reelection rates is not
universal. There are some years for which consumer sentiment is relatively high and incumbent
reelection rates are uncharacteristically low. However, in general, a correlation between
incumbent reelection rates and consumer sentiment exists, and the evidence is such that I believe
the correlation is telling as to the impact of the economy on incumbents’ prospects for reelection.
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Figure 3.2- University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Graph

A relationship between consumer sentiment and public approval ratings of Congress was
also evident. In general, when consumer sentiment increased, public approval of Congress
increased as well. Figure 3.1 illustrates the positive correlation between consumer sentiment and
public approval of Congress. For example, from 1996 to 1998, consumer sentiment rose from
93.6 to 104.6. In 1996 and 1998, public approval levels of Congress reached 44.5% and 55.8%,
respectively. Likewise, from 2006 to 2008, consumer sentiment fell from 87.3 to 63.8, while the
public approval levels of Congress for 2006 and 2008 were 33.3% and 26.4%, respectively.
Although a correlation was evident, the decade from 2000 to 2010 seems to undermine evidence
of a relationship between consumer sentiment and public approval of Congress. I believe events
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such as September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan overshadowed
consumer sentiment in its effect on public approval levels of Congress.
Figure 3.2 highlights the effect of periods of economic downturn on consumer
confidence. The shaded areas in the graph represent periods of U.S. economic recession. During
those periods, consumer confidence is lower than for those years not plagued by recession. The
shading around 1992 in Figure 3.2 corresponds with a low incumbent reelection rate in 1992 as
evidenced in Figure 3.1. In the 1992 election, 88.3% of incumbents were reelected, which
represents the third lowest percentage of incumbents reelected since 1974. Although 1992 was a
presidential election year, the correlation between consumer sentiment and incumbent losses is
evident. Figure 3.2 also indicates that the United States faced a recession during the 2002
election. However, as will be explained in a future chapter, the recession of 2002 was not the
deciding factor in determining the election outcome. National security superseded the economy
as the most important issue for the 2002 election cycle. Regardless, by analyzing both Figures
3.1 and 3.2, it is evident that the economy and the public’s perception of the performance of the
economy, specifically consumer sentiment levels, can have a significant effect on incumbent
reelection rates. The public’s great concern for their economic prospects and their
responsiveness to economic downturns as evidenced by their ousting of usually popular
incumbents, illustrates the importance of the economy in determining election outcomes.

Public Disapproval of Congress
Throughout this chapter, which contains my analysis of the economy’s influence on
congressional elections, with the potential to upset the incumbency advantage, there is evidence
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of public approval of Congress also being impacted by the state of economy. As part of my
general hypothesis, I put forth that public disapproval levels of Congress have the potential to
precipitate high turnover and supersede the incumbency advantage. However, in many election
years, high disapproval with Congress does not by itself indicate seat changes on Election Day.
In general, public disapproval of Congress, however varying, has been a mainstay of politics
since World War Two. Still, most years incumbents gain reelection. Figure 3.1, above, contains
the public approval levels of Congress since Gallup began collecting this data in 1974. In the
2010 election, 76.1% of the public disapproved of the way in which Congress was handling its
job. In 2002, the people were more approving of Congress, as only 35.7% of those polled
expressed disapproval. In 1998, the public again largely approved of the way Congress handled
its job, as 44.2% disapproved. Finally, in 1994, 67.2% of those polled indicated disapproval
with Congress. Looking at these percentages on the surface, when a majority of the public
disapproved of Congress, the majority in the House of Representatives switched parties.
However, only under certain circumstances will public disapproval levels reach a high enough
level to spur incumbent losses. I believe that a particularly poorly performing economy is a
sufficient enough circumstance for such losses.
I believe that when the economy is perceived to be performing poorly, evidenced by high
unemployment and low consumer sentiment, the public disapproves of the way in which
Congress is handling its job more so than when the economy is performing well. Figure 3.1
shows that both consumer sentiment and unemployment share an inverse relationship with public
approval levels of Congress. When consumer sentiment is high, public disapproval levels are
low. Likewise, in general, when more people are employed, public disapproval of Congress is
lower than when unemployment is elevated. Thus, I conclude that public disapproval levels of
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Congress and economic factors such as unemployment and consumer sentiment are linked. One
piece of the puzzle in figuring out when public approval levels impact congressional elections is,
I believe, the performance or perceived performance of the economy on behalf of the electorate.
Since the economy is a strong factor in determining how voters cast their ballots, I can safely
propose here than public approval levels of Congress do indeed have the potential to impact
congressional elections, and upset the incumbency advantage should the economy be performing
poorly.

Case Studies: The 1998, 2010, 1994, and 2002Midterm Elections
Case studies of midterm elections will allow me to further explore the effect of the
economy on incumbent reelection rates and public opinion of Congress. Each midterm election
year, 1998, 2010, 1994 and 2002 offers a different twist to the impact of the economy on
elections and approval ratings. The importance of the economy as a variable of elections and a
deterrent of the incumbency advantage and approval ratings of Congress can be thoroughly
tested via the use of case studies. I chose these midterm election cycles due to the fact that all
were impacted by the economy, in positive as well as negative fashions, yet illustrate the
shortcomings of the economy as the end-all variable of elections and congressional approval
ratings. Therefore, further analysis of what impacts public approval of Congress and
congressional elections is needed, and will be investigated in future chapters of this thesis.
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The 1998 Midterm Elections
Analyzing an election cycle for which the economy was relatively strong can highlight
the effect of a weak economy on incumbents’ chances for reelection. The 1998 election cycle,
with the backdrop of a well-performing economy, can serve as the antithesis to an election for
which a weak-economy dominated the outcome. As a result of the 1998 election cycle, the
Democratic party gained five seats in the House of Representatives (Highton 2002). This result
runs contrary to the historical pattern that the president’s party usually loses seats in the House of
Representatives during midterm elections (Highton 2002). One of the reasons for the success of
the president’s party during the 1998 midterm elections was the strong performance of the
economy (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999). As Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1999, 255)
discuss, “the performance of the U.S. economy in 1998 was very good by objective standards,
with unemployment and inflation at low levels.” The attitudes of the people toward the economy
are illustrated by examining the exit polls after the 1998 elections. That year, the proportion of
respondents that indicated their economic prospects “had improved over the two previous years
was 41 percent, while only 13 percent said it was worse” (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999,
255).
Analyzing Figure 3.1 above can further illustrate the importance of the economy in
ensuring a positive election cycle. Although Bill Clinton’s party benefitted due to positive
associations with the president, the Republican party in terms of the number of incumbents
returned to office was successful as well. A healthy 98.3 percent of incumbents were reelected
in 1998, and I argue that the performance of the economy ensured the incumbents’ success.
Figure 3.1 also illustrates that a normal and reasonable amount, 4.5%, of adults were
unemployed during 1998, highlighting the economic health of the nation. Public disapproval of
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Congress was at a low 42.2 percent, I argue due to the economic vitality of the people and the
nation as a whole. Finally, consumer sentiment as measured by the University of Michigan
achieved an index of 104.6, good for the second highest score ever measured from 1978 to 2010.
Analyzing the good fortunes of incumbents in 1998 from an economic perspective underscores
the importance of the economy in shaping the decisions of the people, based on their collective
satisfaction.
The economy is only one factor in any election cycle, and other variables impacted the
1998 midterms. Benjamin Highton (2002) argues that the 1998 elections were also impacted by
public evaluations of both President Bill Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Negative
reactions to Gingrich were due in part to the fact that “in January 1997, the House voted to
reprimand Mr. Gingrich and [fine] him $300,000, after the ethics committee concluded that he
had used tax-exempt money to promote Republican goals” and lied to the committee upon
questioning (New York Times 2010). Gingrich was also denounced for hypocrisy, moving to
impeach President Clinton for perjury regarding his extramarital affair while committing
adultery himself. The biggest news story of 1998 was President Clinton’s personal scandal
surrounding his relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Bill Clinton’s image
“as a person” deteriorated, seemingly spelling trouble for the Democratic party in the upcoming
midterms (Highton 2002, 3). However, Clinton’s approval ratings in terms of his job
performance did not suffer losses. “Clinton’s level of presidential approval remained high
throughout the year and on election day…a clear majority (56 percent) of voters approved of ‘the
way Bill Clinton is handling his job as President’” (Highton 2002, 3). Thus, much to the surprise
of political pundits, the Democratic party suffered negligible ill effects from the Lewinsky
scandal. Throughout the year Clinton highlighted his professional success in office, and
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“economic issues were at the forefront” (Highton 2002, 4). In fact, “the budget was balanced
and a surplus…was expected; unemployment, inflation, and interest rates were low; the pace of
economic growth was robust” (Highton 2002, 4). Thus, high approval ratings of Clinton, which
were in large part the result of a well performing economy, were so influential to the outcome of
the 1998 midterm elections that even the most prominent personal scandal in presidential history
and the historical pattern of losses of the president’s party during midterm elections did not
negatively impact Democrats’ prospects for election.
Although other factors led to gains for the Democratic party, the economy was the single
most important factor impacting the election in 1998. Granted, negative evaluations of Newt
Gingrich in 1998 and Clinton’s shift toward a more moderate agenda helped the Democratic
party win seats (Highton 2002). Gingrich was “largely blamed for the partial government
shutdown that lasted 27 days in the winter of 1995-1996” and suffered general failure concurrent
with Clinton’s success (Highton 2002, 4). The relative failure that was the 1998 election cycle
for the Republican party was highlighted by the resignation of Gingrich from the House of
Representatives in 1998 after the elections. Yet, the powerful and well performing economy
eclipsed all other issues in spurring success for the Democratic party. The ability of President
Clinton to capitalize on a growing and strong economy and translate such prosperous times to
party gains in Congress is a testament to not only Clinton’s skill as a politician, but also to the
importance of the economy for its impact on congressional election outcomes. As CNN noted on
Saturday, October 31, 1998, “what people care about most…is the pocketbook.” 4

4

“Pocketbook Outweighs Impeachment in U.S. Elections,” CNN.com Election 98, 31 Oct. 1998. Accessed: 20 Jan.
2011 <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/10/31/elex.pocketbook/>.
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The 2010 Midterm Elections
The importance of the economy in its potential to negatively impact incumbents’
reelection rates is evidenced by the case of the 2010 midterm elections. As illustrated in Figure
3.1, the unemployment rate hovered around 9.7% for most of the year, tied with 1982 for the
highest unemployment rate since 1974. The public in general was dissatisfied with the economy,
and unemployment was a key indicator of its underperformance. Public disapproval of Congress
was 76.1% as measured by Gallup, the highest rate of disapproval since 1992. Finally, consumer
sentiment, although up from 2008, reached an index score of 71.6, a relatively low number.
These two economic factors, which indicated a poorly performing economy, translated into a
mere 87% of incumbents achieving reelection. In 2010, the economy became the biggest issue
impacting the midterm elections.
I believe that the 2010 midterm elections are a good representation of the power of the
economy in impacting voters’ decisions. A poorly performing economy can spell trouble for
usually safe incumbent candidates. Dennis Jacobe (2010a, 2010b) in a lead-up to the 2010
midterm elections noted a significant downturn in consumer confidence beginning in midAugust. During the beginning of September, “47% of Americans rated current economic
conditions as ‘poor’” (Jacobe 2010a). During the same time period, “63% of consumers…said
economic conditions [were] ‘getting worse’” (Jacobe 2010a). In an exit poll conducted by ABC
News, “eighty-nine percent of voters said the national [economy was in] bad shape—nearly as
many as the record 92 percent who said so two years ago” (Langer 2010). In addition, a mere
fourteen percent responded that their family’s economic standing improved from 2008 to 2010,
which accounts for the lowest percentage of voters since 1984 (Langer 2010).
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This national distress stemming from the economy hurt the Democrats’ chances of
maintaining control of the House of Representatives. Two years prior, “in 2008 54 percent of
[voters who noted the poor state of the economy] favored Barack Obama. This year, 55 percent
backed Republicans for the House” (Langer 2010). Highlighting the state of the economy as an
issue of paramount importance was the fact that during an exit poll conducted for ABC News,
“62 percent of voters [polled] picked [the economy] as the single most important issue in their
vote…It was the first time economy voters favored Republicans” (Langer 2010). When asked
directly if the “economy [was] the most important issue facing [the] country,” 63% of
respondents answered yes in confirmation (CNN 2010). As for picking what respondents
believed to be the highest priority for the next Congress, 18% chose cutting taxes, 40% chose
cutting the deficit, and 37% chose spending to create new jobs (CNN 2010). All of these
responses are partly economic in nature, underscoring the importance of the economy. A full
86% of respondents to the exit poll were “worried about economic conditions” (CNN 2010). In
addition, 90% of respondents noted that the “state of the nation’s economy” was “not good/poor”
(CNN 2010). In all, 61% of respondents noted that they believed the country was on the “wrong
track” for the future, a testament, I believe, to their dissatisfaction with the current state of the
economy (CNN 2010). A clear majority of respondents indicating that the economy is on the
wrong track is evidence of dissatisfaction with the current state of the economy, in that a future
economic outlook is impacted by current evaluations of the state of the economy and economic
policies. Jacobe (2010b) forecasted that “there is no doubt that declining consumer sentiment is
not good for incumbent politicians.” His forecast proved to be correct in that, as previously
noted, a mere 87% of incumbents were returned to office in the latest election cycle, which is a

58

historically low percentage. As a result, the Democratic party lost the majority in the House of
Representatives.
The poor performance of incumbents during the 2010 election cycle was due to the poor
performance of the economy. Related is the fact that in 2010, Congress ranked last in
maintaining the confidence of the public as an institution (Saad 2010a). Only “eleven percent of
Americans say they have ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in Congress,” good for
“ranking dead last out of the 16 institutions rated this year” (Saad 2010a). Half of those polled
reported that they had “‘very little’ or ‘no’ confidence in Congress” (Saad 2010a). The poor
ratings of Congress in terms of confidence are related to the poor performance of the economy
and the lack of an effective response by Congress. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 2002)
illustrate that the people disapprove of Congress due to, among other things, suspected
inefficiency. Since the people expect Congress to fix the economy as necessary, a poorly
performing economy coupled with the appearance of inefficiency would negatively impact
public approval levels of the national legislature. The lowest incumbent reelection rate since
1974 was, in great part, the result of the poorly performing economy in 2010.

The 1994 Midterm Elections
I argue as part of my hypothesis that the results of the 1994 midterm elections, which
brought about the “Republican Revolution,” were due mostly to a growing dissatisfaction with
what was popularized by Republicans as “big government.” However, it may be fruitful to
analyze the economic conditions of the country to see if poor economic performance, in part,
stimulated the Republican takeover. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, in 1994 public disapproval of
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Congress was 67.2 percent, down from 77.3% in 1992, but still relatively high in comparison to
percentages later in the decade. Perhaps public disapproval of Congress was due to tough
economic times. The unemployment rate and levels of consumer sentiment would provide us
with answers as to the economic health of the nation in 1994. During that year, the
unemployment rate was 6.1%, which was lower than the 1992 proportion of people unemployed,
which rested at 7.5%. Thus, unemployment, a key factor in how the public judges the economic
performance of the country, was indeed improving. As a result, I posit that unemployment was
not a key variable in precipitating the Republican Revolution. In 1994, consumer sentiment as
measured by the University of Michigan achieved an index of 92.3, up significantly from the
77.3 index measured in 1992. Finally, the incumbent reelection rate in 1994 was 90.2 percent,
which ranks for the fourth lowest incumbent reelection rate since 1974. In comparison to 1990,
the incumbent reelection rate was almost six percentage points lower in 1994, even though
consumer sentiment was 10.7 points higher. In addition, public approval of Congress in 1990
was 35%, while that in 1994 was 32.8%. Therefore, some factor proved strong enough to upset
the incumbency advantage. However, I believe that the economy, which had been improving
since the 1992 election cycle, was not a factor in disturbing the incumbency advantage.
The perception of a positive economy and its impact on public opinion is evidenced by
analyzing the exit polls from 1994. As Alan I. Abramowitz (1995, 875) notes, “thirty-six percent
of respondents said their family’s financial situation had improved in the previous year while 28
percent said that it had deteriorated.” A mere eight percent of respondents believed that their
economic prospects would worsen in 1995 (Abramowitz 1995). These polls indicate that the
people in general felt positive about the economy in 1994. In a future chapter, I will go into
further detail as to why I believe the Republican Revolution came about. I agree with Hibbing
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and Tiritilli (2000, 122), that the effects of “congressional disapproval, [were] greater in 1994
than in most years.” However, I can safely rule out the economy as the reason for the approval
ratings and low incumbent reelection rate.

The 2002 Midterm Elections: A Conflicting Case
The 2002 midterm elections offer a twist in my hypothesis for the impact of the economy
on incumbents’ reelection prospects. An analysis of Figure 3.1 can serve as a starting point for
measuring the economic health of the nation leading up to the 2002 midterms. The
unemployment rate in 2002 was 5.8%, which, although not devastating, was greater than the 4%
unemployment in 2000. Thus, compared to two years prior, in 2002 unemployment impacted
more of the electorate. Figure 3.1 also indicates that consumer sentiment in 2002 achieved an
index of 89.6. Although respectable, that number is much lower than the indexes measured in
1998 and 2000, the two previous elections, which measured 104.6 and 107.6, respectively.
Therefore, consumer sentiment was more negative in 2002 than in the years immediately
preceding the election. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (2003) echo the fact that the economy in
2002 was declining in comparison with previous years. “The performance of the U.S. economy
in 2002 was not very good by objective standards, with unemployment higher than in the Clinton
years, and a stock market that was headed for its third consecutive year of losses” (Abramson,
Aldrich, and Rohde 2003, 259). In a poll the day before Election Day 2002, CBS News found
that “53 percent of respondents believed that the condition of the economy was bad or very bad.
Moreover, 34 percent thought the economy was getting worse,” compared with only seventeen
percent believing the economy was improving (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2003, 259).
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Analyzing the economic data and the public’s perception of the state of the economy, I would
expect public disapproval levels of Congress to be higher than in previous years. However, only
35.7% of the people disapproved of the way Congress handled its job, as indicated in Figure 3.1.
In addition, only 3.8% of incumbents weren’t reelected on Election Day in 2002.
Although the economy was relatively weak leading up to the 2002 election cycle, the
Republican party was able to maintain and strengthen their majority due to, in part, “the
undeniable, if unintended, gift of Osama bin Laden” (Jacobson 2003, 1). As noted in a previous
chapter, the Republican party was better equipped to handle what would become the political
issue of national security. George W. Bush and the rest of the Republican leadership had a more
concrete plan for addressing terrorism (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2003). Thus, in 2002,
although the economy was perceived to be weak, especially in the wake of the 1990s economic
boom, the Republican party expanded their majority in both houses of Congress. Gary C.
Jacobson (2003) also notes that the high approval ratings of President Bush could account for the
Republicans’ victory in 2002. Yet, the source of Bush’s high approval ratings were rooted in his
handling of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, thus underscoring the great relevance of the issue of
national security for the 2002 elections, which will be discussed in further detail in a later
chapter of this thesis.

Conclusion
This chapter focused on the economy and its impact on public approval levels of
Congress and the incumbency advantage. I created Figure 3.1 to examine key variables together,
specifically to determine whether a relationship exists between the economy and congressional
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elections. Figure 3.1 plotted the percentage of incumbents reelected, the unemployment rate,
consumer sentiment, and public disapproval levels of Congress from 1974 to 2010. Although the
unemployment and incumbency reelection rates didn’t correlate enough to form a convincing
argument as to a connection between the two, comparing consumer sentiment and incumbent
reelection for each year proved to be a successful avenue. In general, when consumer sentiment
was high, incumbents enjoyed their expected advantage in the elections. When consumer
sentiment was low, incumbents were more likely to be ousted from office. In addition, I found
that the people are more likely to disapprove of Congress when they have less confidence in the
economy.
After analyzing the data, I delved into specific case studies to further scrutinize my
hypothesis. First, the midterm elections of 1998 illustrate the power of a strong economy in
benefitting incumbents as well at the president’s party in Congress. President Clinton’s personal
scandal and the historical pattern of losses for the president’s party in the House of
Representatives during midterm elections were superseded by one the strongest performing
economies in this country’s history. Conversely, in 2010, the poorly performing economy
spelled disaster for the majority party in Congress. The Democratic party lost the majority in the
House of Representatives, mostly due to high unemployment, low consumer sentiment, and low
public approval of Congress. As a result, the lowest proportion of incumbents since 1974 were
reelected, a diminutive 87 percent. The election cycle of 2010 served as the prototype year for
demonstrating the negative effects of a poorly performing economy on incumbent reelection
rates. The 1994 midterm elections show that the economy is not the only factor that can impact
congressional elections and yield incumbent losses. In comparison to 1992, the economic health
of the nation was improving in 1994. However, the “Republican Revolution” upset the
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incumbency advantage to such an extent that the Republican party regained control of the House
of Representatives for the first time in over forty years. A future chapter will analyze such
topical issues as having the potential to impact congressional elections. Finally, the 2002
elections also illustrate the importance of emerging topical issues for congressional election
outcomes. In 2002, the economy was suffering high unemployment and low consumer
confidence. Yet, the incumbency advantage remained intact while public disapproval of
Congress was comparatively negligible. As a future chapter will discuss, national security saved
incumbent Republicans from the ill effects of a languishing economy.
In all, I believe that this chapter offers convincing evidence to the importance of the
economy in congressional elections, less convincing evidence to a correlation between the
economy and public approval levels of Congress, and a real potential of the economy to disrupt
the incumbency advantage. I believe that the economy has a stronger influence on congressional
elections than on public approval levels of Congress. Consumer sentiment was a more reliable
correlate than unemployment with incumbent reelection rates, most probably due to the fact that
sentiment measures overall perceptions, and unemployment affects a smaller proportion of the
population directly. This does not diminish the influence of the economy on elections and public
approval levels of Congress, as sentiment and unemployment are both economic indicators.
However, this relative weakness must be kept in mind when evaluating the impact of
unemployment. The economy is only part of the puzzle in determining when incumbents lose
their long-standing advantage. Midterm evaluations of the president and emerging salient issues
offer further explanations of congressional election outcomes. The next two chapters will
analyze these issues in detail by examining election years as case studies and discovering what
the major news stories were in those years. Public disapproval of Congress had the potential to
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become a factor when the economy was performing poorly. Similarly, public disapproval of
Congress, I believe, will develop into a factor in determining election outcomes for those years
in which presidential evaluations and emerging contemporary issues disrupt the incumbency
advantage.
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Chapter Four
Midterm Evaluations of the President, Congressional Approval Ratings, and
Incumbent Reelection Rates

In this chapter, I will be focusing on the relationship among midterm approval ratings of
presidents, incumbent reelection rates, and public disapproval of Congress. Part of my
hypothesis is that, in certain cases, the performance or perceived performance of the president
can impact how the public views Congress. If the public disapproves of the performance of the
chief executive, they are more likely to disapprove of Congress, especially if the majority is of
the president’s party. I posit that public approval of Congress, approval of the president, and the
fortunes of incumbent congressional candidates are linked. As a result, if the public approves of
the president’s performance, the president’s party will benefit during the midterms, and vice
versa. In addition, public approval of Congress and public approval of the president, I
hypothesize, are correlated. The historical pattern has been that the president’s party loses seats
in midterm elections (Campbell 1985). However, this trend is not universal and the extent of
seat losses, when they do occur, can be affected by the level of public approval of the chief
executive. As Gronke, Koch, and Wilson (2003, 785) demonstrate, “perceived levels of
presidential support…shape attitudes toward congressional incumbents.” When the level of
support for the president is low, individual members of the public are more likely to have
negative evaluations of incumbent representatives, precipitating midterm losses for members of
the president’s party.
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James E. Campbell (1985) discusses two types of theories to explain midterm losses for
the president’s party. The first group is the “coattails/surge and decline theories,” which note
that a strong performance by the president in the election immediately preceding the midterms
will prompt higher losses in the midterm cycle (Campbell 1985, 1140). The lack of a
presidential race during midterms precipitates the removal of the coattail effect which benefits
congressional candidates. “In effect, the bigger they are, the harder they fall” (Campbell 1985,
1140). The second group of theories Campbell dubs the “economy/popularity theories,” which
argue that the midterm election is a referendum by the public concerning the state of the
economy, the president’s handling of the economy, and the president’s general popularity among
the electorate (Campbell 1985, 1140). The second group of theories purports to explain the
outcome of the midterm elections as a result of the state of the economy as well as the public’s
approval level of the president.
For the purposes of this chapter, my discussion will center more on the second set of
theories discussed by Campbell (1985). Even though both sets of theories can help to explain
midterm election outcomes, I am primarily concerned with presidential popularity. Presidential
popularity fluctuates over time, based on individual performance. This fluctuation and the
public’s response to presidential performance, as well as its effect on approval levels of
representatives in the House, will be my primary focus.

The Data
Figure 4.1, reproduced below, is a graph of incumbent reelection rates, presidential
approval ratings, public approval levels of Congress, and the number of seats lost by the
67

president’s party in the midterms for each election cycle from 1974 to 2010. I included both
midterm and presidential years to ensure a more holistic view of the trends among incumbent
reelection rates and public approval ratings of both the president and Congress. Although my
overall analysis is narrowed to midterm elections, including presidential election years in Figure
4.1 does not detract from my analysis. Analyzing this graph will demonstrate whether or not
there is a correlation between presidential approval ratings and congressional incumbent losses,
as well as congressional approval ratings. More specifically, Figure 4.1 can give insight as to the
effect of negative evaluations of the president on his own party, measuring how many seats the
president’s party loses in midterm elections.
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Figure 4.1- Incumbent Reelection Rates, Presidential Approval Ratings, Public Approval of
Congress, and Number of Seats Lost by President’s Party in Midterms
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Presidential Approval Ratings and the Incumbent Reelection Rate
In analyzing Figure 4.1, there is a strong correlation between presidential approval ratings
and the incumbent reelection rate. In general, as the public becomes more approving of the
president, incumbents are more likely to be reelected. For example, from 1990 to 1992, the
percentage of respondents who approved of the president fell from 58% to 43%. In those same
years, the percentage of incumbents winning reelection fell from 96.1% to 88.3%. From 1994 to
1996, presidential approval increased from 58% to 66%. In those same years, the percentage of
incumbents reelected rose from 90.2% to 94%. In general, the percentage of people who
approve of the president and the percentage of incumbents reelected track together in a positive
relationship. However, the two ratings are not universally correlated. For example, from 2002
to 2004, presidential approval ratings fell from 63% to 53%. Yet, from 2002 to 2004, the
proportion of incumbents reelected rose from 96.2% to 97.8%. This lack of a positive
relationship could be the result of 2004 being a presidential year, which speaks to Campbell’s
(1985) argument regarding the coattail effect in presidential election cycles. The election cycles
from 2008 to 2010 also offer conflicting information. During those years, presidential approval
rose from 25% to 45%, yet the incumbent reelection rate fell from 94% to 87%. Presidential
approval most likely increased as a result of the election of a popular President Obama and the
exit of the increasingly unpopular George W. Bush. The decline of the incumbent reelection rate
from 2008 to 2010, again, could be the result of the lack of a coattail effect (Campbell 1985).
The data in Figure 4.1 confirm a relationship between presidential approval and
incumbent representatives’ reelection rates. The presence of such a relationship is convincing of
an impact of presidential approval ratings on congressional elections. Public approval of
Congress, which I believe to be a determinant of incumbent reelection rates, may also be
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impacted by presidential approval. The presence of such a relationship will be tested in a later
section of this chapter. First, however, I want to measure the extent of the effect of presidential
approval ratings on election outcomes, by discovering how many seats the president’s party has
lost in midterm elections. I posit that lower approval ratings of the president will prompt a more
negative outcome for members of the president’s party during midterm election cycles.

Presidential Approval Ratings and the Number of Seats Lost by the President’s Party
The impact of presidential approval ratings on the fortunes of members of the president’s
party can be evaluated by examining the number of seats lost by the president’s party in midterm
elections. I posit that if the incumbency advantage were to be overcome by a high level of
presidential disapproval, more seats belonging to the president’s party in midterm elections
would be lost. Figure 4.1 can be used to compare presidential approval ratings and the number
of seats lost in the midterms by the president’s party. In eight out of ten midterm elections from
1974 to 2010, the president’s party has lost seats, evidence of the pattern illustrated by Campbell
(1985). In 1998 and 2002, the president’s party actually gained seats in the midterm elections,
but these are aberrations sufficiently explained, I believe, by extenuating circumstances of one of
the most prosperous economies in 1998 and national security issues in 2002.
The pattern of midterm losses for the president’s party is a firm one. In 1974,
presidential approval rested at 47%, corresponding with 43 seats lost by the president’s party. In
1978, 49% of the public approved of the president and 11 seats were lost by the president’s
party. In 1982, 43% of those polled approved of the president and 26 seats were lost by the
president’s party in the midterms. In 1986, presidential approval rested at a higher 63%, and
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only five seats were lost by the president’s party. In 1990, presidential approval was 58%, and
nine seats were lost by George H.W. Bush’s party. In 1994, 46% of the public approved of Bill
Clinton, and 52 seats were lost by the Democratic party. In 2006, a small 38% of the public
approved of President George W. Bush, and the Republican party lost thirty seats in the House.
Finally, in 2010, forty-five percent of the public approved of Barack Obama, and the Democratic
party lost a record-breaking 63 seats. It seems that the higher the approval of the president, the
lower the number of seats the president’s party loses in the midterms, most evident in 1986 and
1990. Likewise, the lower the approval rating, the higher the number of seats lost by the
president’s party in the midterms. However, there is not a purely positive correlation with
presidential approval and the number of seats lost by the president’s party. For example,
approval was higher in 1974 compared with 1982, yet in 1974, 43 seats were lost compared with
only 26 lost in 1982. Similarly, in 2006, a smaller percentage of the public approved of the
president than in 2010, but more seats were lost in 2006. The correlation between presidential
approval and the number of seats lost by the president’s party is not perfect, that is, there is no
formula for assessing the number of seats the president’s party will lose just by evaluating the
chief executive’s approval rating. Still, I find the overall evidence convincing of a relationship
between presidential approval and congressional election outcomes.

Presidential Approval Levels and Public Approval of Congress
A relationship between presidential approval and public approval of Congress is not
wholly clear after an analysis of the data. A correlation exists, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, and is
evidence, I believe, of a tentative link between presidential performance and public approval of
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Congress. When presidential approval levels rise, public approval levels of Congress likewise
increase, and vice versa. The years 1988-1990, 1998-2000, 2000-2002, and 2008-2010 represent
the only instances between election cycles when public approval of the president and public
approval of Congress did not trend together. From 1988-1990, presidential approval increased
while public approval of Congress decreased. From 1998-2000, presidential approval decreased
while congressional approval increased. From 2000-2002, presidential approval remained the
same, yet public approval of Congress increased. Finally, from 2008-2010, presidential approval
increased, yet congressional approval decreased. In every other year from 1974 to the present, a
positive correlation existed. The highest level of presidential approval, 63% reached in 2002
under President George W. Bush, correlated with the highest level of public approval of
Congress, which rested at 64.3% in that year. The lowest public approval rating of the president,
25% for George W. Bush in 2008, correlated with the third-lowest public approval rating of
Congress, at 26.4%. The only other lower levels of approval of Congress were in 2010, when a
mere 23.9% of the public approved of the body and in 1992, when 22% of the public approved of
Congress.
Although presidential approval levels and congressional approval levels trend together,
Figure 4.1 illustrates that the relationship between public approval of the president and public
approval of Congress is not clear cut. An analysis of the number of seats the president’s party
loses in the midterms and public approval of Congress suggests that a positive correlation
between public approval of Congress and presidential performance may not be steadfast. One
would hypothesize that if a strong link existed between public approval of Congress and public
approval of the president, when public approval of Congress decreases, the number of seats the
president’s party loses in the midterms increases from one midterm cycle of the next. The
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opposite relationship would also be true, in that when public approval of Congress increases, the
number of seats lost by the president’s party would decrease. Similarly, when presidential
approval is low, the number of seats lost by the president’s party would increase, and vice versa.
These scenarios do not pan out as expected. The only years when such a relationship manifests
itself in a convincing manner is from 1978 to 1982, 1982 to 1986, and 2006 to 2010. Figure 4.1
illustrates that from 1978 to 1982, public approval of Congress decreased from 51% to 46%.
Also, presidential approval decreased from 49% to 43%. The number of seats lost by the
president’s party increased from eleven to twenty-six over this time period. From 1982 to 1986,
public approval of Congress increased from 46% to 63%, presidential approval increased from
43% to 63%, and in those years the president’s party lost 26 and 5 seats, respectively. Finally,
from 2006 to 2010, public approval of Congress decreased from 33.3% to 23.9%, yet presidential
approval increased from 38% to 45%, and the number of seats lost by the president’s party
increased from thirty to sixty-three seats. One may be led to believe that from 2006 to 2010,
changes in public approval of Congress increased the number of seats the president’s party lost
more so than did the increase in presidential approval. Although this evidence may seem
convincing, further analysis proves otherwise.
From 1986 to 1990, public approval of Congress decreased from 63% to 35%,
presidential approval decreased from 63% to 58%, and the number of seats lost by the
president’s party increased from five to nine seats. However, the change in the number of seats
is negligible, especially considering the large drop in the percentage of those approving of
Congress. Similarly, from 1990 to 1994, public approval of Congress fell from 35% to 32.8%,
yet the number of seats lost by the president’s party increased dramatically from nine to fifty-two
seats. If the relationship between public approval of Congress and presidential performance was
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steadfast, a large increase in the number of seats lost by the president’s party should have
coincided with a larger drop in public approval of Congress than the 35% to 32.8% drop. The
large increase in the number of seats lost by the president’s party is also not adequately explained
by the decrease in presidential approval ratings from 58% to 46%. More convincing of the lack
of such a relationship is the fact that from 1974-1978, 1994-1998, 1998-2002, and 2002-2006,
the expected relationship between public approval of Congress and the number of seats lost by
the president’s party at the midterms, should such a relationship exist, did not manifest itself.
Similarly, the relationship between presidential approval and the number of seats lost by the
president’s party, should that relationship exist, did not yield the expected outcomes in those
years.
The relationship between public approval of Congress and the performance of the
president is ultimately not clear. Public approval levels of Congress and approval ratings of the
president do trend together, which point to a relationship between the two. However, public
approval levels of Congress and the number of seats lost by the president’s party at the midterm
elections do not show a strong relationship. Presidential approval and the number of seats lost
by the president’s party similarly do not show a firm relationship. This uncertainty forces me to
conclude that a relationship between presidential performance and public approval ratings of
Congress is not immediately evident. This does not detract from the evidence pointing to a
relationship between public approval of the president and midterm election outcomes, but the
role of public approval of Congress is not clear.
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Case Studies
Case studies allow us to further delve into the impact of presidential performance on
congressional elections and congressional approval. The 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010 elections
will serve as case studies, in that each year offers a different example of the impact of
presidential performance. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama are all
polarizing figures for different reasons, and impacted midterm elections in different ways. Data
such as exit polls, newspaper and scholarly accounts of presidential performance, and the way in
which the public perceived each president had an impact on each of these midterm election
cycles.

The 1994 Midterm Elections: President Bill Clinton
Public evaluations of President Bill Clinton had some impact on the election of 1994,
known as the “Republican Revolution.” The rise of Newt Gingrich and the nationalization of the
election, the issue of greatest importance in 1994, will be discussed in a future chapter. In
addition to the prominence of Speaker Gingrich and his role in restoring the Republican party to
the majority in the House of Representatives, evaluations of President Clinton had a part in
spurring Democratic losses in 1994. Figure 4.1 demonstrates that Clinton’s job approval rating
in 1994 was 46%. This level was significantly lower than the presidential job approval ratings
for 1988, 1990, and to a lesser extent, 1992. In 1994, the public had been experiencing a
downward shift in its approval of the president. Clinton’s lowest approval rating was 37%,
measured in 1993 (Gallup 2001). Clinton’s worst approval ratings were measured at the dawn of
the 1994 midterms, adding to the public unrest which resulted in the second highest seat change
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since 1974. At the time of the election, CNN reported that 48% of the public approved of
President Clinton (PollingReport.com 2001). Self-identifying Republicans anchored an
increasingly vehement and negative public evaluation of the president (Gallup 2001).
James E. Campbell (1997, 832) explains that “midterm elections are partially referenda
on the incumbent administration.” President Clinton’s midterm approval rating in 1994 was
“nine points below the average presidential rating at the midterm” (Campbell 1997, 832).
Clinton’s relatively lower approval rating, although not the primary cause of the Republican
Revolution, negatively impacted incumbent Democrats’ chances of reelection in the House.
Public approval of Congress at the 1994 midterms was 32.8%, which, although an increase from
1992, was low from a historical standpoint. The impact of low approval levels of Congress on
the 1994 midterm elections will be analyzed in greater detail in a future chapter. Public approval
of Congress became relevant in 1994 once the Republican leadership pointed out the alleged
shortcomings of the Democratic majority. Although Clinton’s approval ratings were low, I do
not believe that they were the primary cause of the 1994 outcomes. Still, it can be said that
Clinton’s low approval ratings did not benefit Democratic incumbents, and most certainly added
to their downfall.

The 1998 Midterm Elections: President Bill Clinton
At the time of the 1998 midterm elections, President Clinton’s approval ratings had
increased dramatically. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, in 1998 Clinton’s approval rating rested at
66%. That proportion of people who approved of Clinton was up from 46% in 1994 and 58% in
1996. Immediately before the election, NBC News reported that Clinton’s approval rating
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among the electorate was 68% (PollingReport.com 2001). The upward trend in the proportion of
people who approved of the president benefitted Democratic incumbent members of the House
of Representatives. In 1998, Clinton’s Democratic party did not lose any seats in the House of
Representatives, one of only two midterm cycles in which the president’s party did not lose
seats, the other being the 2002 midterm election. In fact, the Democrats gained five seats in the
House of Representatives, a much more favorable outcome for the party than the fifty-two seat
loss in 1994 (Highton 2002). Clinton’s high point in terms of approval rating was in December
of 1998, when 73% of the people approved of the president (Gallup 2001). Correspondingly,
public approval of Congress in 1998 rested at 55.8%, a relatively high proportion from a
historical standpoint. This high approval rating of Congress could have accounted for the
Democrats’ seat gains. I believe that the increased legislative role of the president in setting an
agenda and proposing legislation causes the electorate to conflate the performance of Congress
and the chief executive. Therefore, a high public approval of Congress could be the result of
high approval ratings of the president, and vice versa. Although the 1998 Congress was a
Republican majority, Clinton’s high approval ratings had a positive effect on the federal
government as a whole.
The portrayal of Clinton in public impacted the way in which people evaluated the
president. His supporters characterized Clinton as an accomplished president whose legislative
successes spurred economic prosperity (Highton 2002). His opponents characterized Clinton as
a man of questionable moral character in light of the Monica Lewinsky affair (Highton 2002).
Exit polls from Election Day 1998 allow us to analyze the effectiveness of these two
characterizations of President Clinton. Evaluations of Clinton can be divided into two
categories: Clinton “the person” and Clinton the president (Highton 2002). Clinton “the person”
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did not fare well at the exit polls, where 58% held a negative evaluation as compared with 34%
of the electorate holding a positive evaluation (Highton 2002). The Republican scheme to
tarnish Clinton’s image in hopes of yielding Democratic losses seemed to have affected the
category of evaluations pertaining to Clinton’s personal qualities. Clinton as an adulterer and
perjurer was not held in high regard at the exit polls in 1998 (Gallup 2011d). However, Clinton
the president fared well at the exit polls. “As president,” 56% of the electorate polled held a
positive evaluation of Clinton (Highton 2002, 3). Forty-two percent of those polled held a
negative evaluation of the president (Highton 2002). Therefore, in terms of Clinton’s
performance in his role as chief executive, the public found him to be more than satisfactory.
The Republican party’s attempt to portray Clinton as a man of questionable moral
character did not negatively impact the way in which the public evaluated his performance as
president. “Beginning with his State of the Union address on January 27 and continuing to
Election Day, Clinton and his supporters drew sharp distinctions between his ‘private life’ and
his presidential performance” (Highton 2002, 4). A strong economy, highlighted by a surplus,
and popular stances on issues such as a ‘Consumer Bill of Rights’ for patients under an HMO
and a more moderate agenda enhanced Clinton’s approval ratings to the point of benefitting the
Democratic party immensely (Highton 2002, 4). Clinton’s high approval along with Speaker
Gingrich’s low approval ratings positively affected Democrats’ chances in the 1998 midterm
cycle. The 1998 midterms serve as a case study of a president’s high approval positively
impacting his party’s fortunes in the House of Representatives.
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The 2002 Midterm Elections: President George W. Bush
The 2002 election, in part, was impacted by President George W. Bush’s response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The public had an extremely positive view of both
President Bush and Congress post-9/11 (Jacobson 2003). A poll conducted by ABC News from
October 31 to November 3, 2002, reported that 67% of the public approved of the way President
Bush handled “his job as president” (PollingReport.com 2009). “The events of September 11th
and their aftermath profoundly transformed the electoral context of 2002, most importantly by
redefining the Bush presidency and transforming public perceptions of the president” (Jacobson
2003, 3). The impact of September 11th on Bush’s approval ratings is evidenced by Figure 4.2, a
reproduction from Gary C. Jacobson’s (2003, 4) article on the 2002 midterms. The spike in
presidential approval in early September was the result of Bush’s popular response to the
terrorist attacks.
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Figure 4.2

Figure 4.1 demonstrates the popularity of the government in 2002, a result I believe of an
increased sense of patriotism across the country. The role of patriotism following the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks will be analyzed in a future chapter of this thesis. President Bush’s
approval rating in November of 2002 was 63%, second best only to Clinton’s approval rating of
66% in 1998, and tied with those of 2000 as well as 1986, under President Ronald Reagan. The
iconic image of Bush standing atop a heap of rubble at the World Trade Center and the
symbolism of that moment positively affected Bush’s approval ratings. The approval rating of
Congress was also higher than average, resting at 64.3%. That percentage ranks first for
approval ratings of Congress since 1974, the year Gallup began measuring congressional
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approval. In 2002, Bush’s Republican party did not lose any seats in Congress, an atypical
midterm outcome by historical standards (Campbell 1985). The popularity of President Bush
and Congress after 9/11 will be discussed in a future chapter to this thesis, on the importance of
topical issues for congressional election outcomes and public approval of Congress.

The 2010 Midterm Elections: President Barack Obama
The 2010 midterms were part of the focus of Chapter Three of this thesis, on the power of
the economy in spurring public disapproval and incumbent losses. The 2010 election cycle is
also, however, a good example of how decreasing public approval ratings of the president can
negatively impact incumbents’ chances for reelection. Coming off a popular 2008 presidential
campaign, Barack Obama’s approval ratings fell dramatically in 2010, spelling trouble for a
Democratic-majority Congress. Figure 4.1 shows that public approval of President Obama in
November of 2010 rested at 45%. However, in 2009, Obama’s approval rating was 69%, his
highest since taking office (Gallup 2011b). Likewise, public approval of Congress also
decreased, falling to 23.9% as seen in Figure 4.1. In the largest ever number of seats lost by a
president’s party in a midterm, the Democratic party lost 63 seats, enough for the Republican
party to gain control of the House of Representatives. Only 87% of incumbents were reelected,
making 2010 the year with the lowest incumbent reelection rate since 1974.
The exit polls from the 2010 midterm elections can give more insight into how the public
felt about Obama and Congress. When “asked about Obama’s policies overall, about half of
voters predicted he would hurt the country” (Swanson 2010, 1). A Gallup poll from Election
Day indicated that 44% of the electorate approved of President Obama’s “job as president”
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(PollingReport.com 2011a). The economy seems to have been the reason for Obama’s and
Congress’ low approval ratings (Gallup 2011c). In an exit poll conducted for ABC News, only
“a third said the administration’s economic stimulus program had helped the economy” (Langer
2010, 1). The stimulus package was signed into law by the Democratic Congress, and both it
and Obama seemed to have taken part of the blame for the $800 billion legislation.
Underscoring the Democratic party’s unpopularity, “seventy-four percent [of respondents to the
exit poll] described themselves as dissatisfied or even angry about the way the federal
government is working” (Langer 2010, 1). The 2010 election cycle, therefore, was a
manifestation of the impact of negative approval ratings of the president and of Congress on
midterm elections. The particularly potent effect yielded a change in the majority party in the
House of Representatives. Although not as important as the state of the economy, President
Obama’s approval ratings in 2010 hurt his Democratic party’s chances in the midterm elections.

Conclusion
This chapter focused on the impact of presidential approval ratings both on midterm
election outcomes and public approval of Congress. I found that presidential approval ratings
strongly correlated with the chances an incumbent wins reelection. However, the relationship
between presidential approval and public approval of Congress was not immediately clear. It
seems that public approval of Congress is not directly impacted by nor directly impacts
presidential approval ratings. Thus, for this portion of my analysis, public approval of Congress
has not proved to be a significant variable. The relationship between public approval of
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Congress and the fortunes of members of the president’s party in the midterms, specifically the
number of seats lost by the president’s party, was inconclusive.
Figure 4.1 graphs presidential approval ratings, incumbent reelection rates, public
approval of Congress, and the number of seats the president’s party has lost, if any, in each
midterm election from 1974 to 2010. As presidential approval decreases, the chances an
incumbent wins reelection also decreases, generally speaking. As presidential approval
decreases, the chief executive’s party is likely to lose more seats than if the president’s approval
was higher. As presidential approval decreases, public approval of Congress also decreases, as
the two seem to be linked. Yet, this correlation is not universal, and therefore I cannot confirm
an impact of public approval of Congress on presidential approval ratings. Therefore, my
hypothesis in this regard has been proven incorrect. What I can give evidence for is that the
incumbency advantage can be overcome if a president is deemed to have done a poor job in
office.
Also in this chapter, I conducted case studies of the midterm elections in 1994, 1998,
2002, and 2010. In each election year, the impact of the president was demonstrable, yet varied
in importance to the outcome of each election cycle. In 1994, a poor evaluation of President
Clinton hastened the Republican Revolution, even though presidential approval was not the issue
of paramount importance. The 1994 election cycle and the rise of Newt Gingrich will be
discussed in further detail in the next chapter of this thesis. In 1998, President Clinton’s
approval ratings had bounced back, reaching one of the highest marks in recent history at 66%.
Clinton’s impressive approval ratings were in spite of his personal scandals, which the
Republican party tried to capitalize on in a public relations campaign against the president. The
Republicans were generally successful in denigrating the president regarding his personal life,
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but that did not transcend to evaluations of his professional performance as chief executive
(Highton 2002). Thus, in 1998, Clinton’s Democratic party fared better than expected (Highton
2002). In the 2002 election cycle, President Bush and the Republican controlled Congress
enjoyed historic approval ratings, mostly due to patriotic fervor following the events of
September 11, 2001. As a result, the president’s party gained seats in the House of
Representatives. The midterm election of 2002 is a good example of the influence of a positive
evaluation of the president and its effect on congressional elections. However, the 2002 election
will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter of this thesis, as I believe patriotism played
a key role in the outcome. Finally, the 2010 elections serve as an example of the negative impact
of low approval ratings of the president on his party’s chances in midterm elections. Low
approval ratings of President Obama and of the Democratic Congress hurt the Democrats’
chances in 2010, hastening the majority takeover by the Republican party. In all, case studies
gave me the opportunity to delve further into the impact of presidential approval ratings on
congressional elections, while reaffirming the lack of a role of public approval of Congress in
this area.
I believe that a convincing case for the influence of presidential approval ratings on
congressional elections has been laid out in this chapter. In contrast, the link among public
approval of Congress, presidential performance, and midterm election outcomes could not be
proven. Exit polls, approval ratings, academic journal articles, and newspaper accounts of
presidential performance and the public’s opinion of the president made it possible to analyze its
effect on midterm elections. The same cannot be said of the role of public approval of Congress.
My overarching hypothesis of the potential for the impact of public approval of Congress on
congressional elections must be amended in light of this information. In the next chapter of this
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thesis, I will discuss the impact of topical issues, namely the emergence of Newt Gingrich and
the issues spurring the Republican Revolution as well as national security following September
11, 2001 on public approval of Congress and congressional election outcomes.
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Chapter Five
Salient Issues and Their Effect on Public Approval of Congress and Congressional
Elections

This chapter focuses on the impact of salient issues on midterm congressional elections
and public approval of Congress. It is my hypothesis that issues of immediate importance have
the potential to play a paramount role in determining an election outcome. These issues are
specific to the election cycle in question, and were important only within the electoral context of
a given midterm year. Based on which of the two major political parties support a popular issue,
or are deemed by the public to put forth a stronger platform concerning an issue, one party will
benefit more than the other in the midterm elections for which the issue played a significant,
overriding role. The economy and midterm evaluations of the president routinely impact
congressional election outcomes and public approval levels of Congress, as evidenced by the
analyses in the two immediately previous chapters of this thesis. However, issues of urgent
importance, what I label salient issues, have the potential to severely impact midterm
congressional elections and influence public approval levels of Congress. It is my belief that in
those years for which an emerging issue of paramount importance manifests itself, the issue
overrides the economy and midterm evaluations of the president in their impact on election
results. The issue could encompass the president’s role as chief executive as well as the work of
Congress, as will be seen in the analysis of the 1994 and 2002 midterm elections. However, in
general, the emerging issue becomes the most important issue impacting the election.
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The first salient issue I will be analyzing is the relevance of the emergence of Newt
Gingrich and the issues he and the Republican leadership emphasized, which led to the
subsequent “Republican Revolution” of 1994. The Republicans’ “Contract with America” and
the Republican-fueled arguments against big government became the most important factors
affecting the outcome of the 1994 midterms. The second salient issue I will analyze is national
security and its impact on the midterm elections in 2002. After the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, national security became an emerging and important issue for the upcoming 2002
midterm cycle. The Republican’s response to 9/11 was applauded by the public, allowing the
party to maintain a majority in Congress (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2003). In all, salient
issues round out my matrix of theories to explain outcomes in congressional elections and
fluctuations in public approval of Congress. This chapter will not include analyses of the 1998
and 2010 midterm elections, which were used as case studies in the previous two chapters. In
those years, the economy and evaluations of the president sufficiently explain the election
outcomes. Newly emerging and salient issues did not impact the 1998 and 2010 midterm
elections as was the case in 1994 and 2002. In all, I believe that an analysis of the importance of
salient issues, combined with the evidence in the balance of this thesis, give a well-rounded
explanation to the question of what impacts congressional election outcomes and public approval
levels of Congress in general.

The Republican Revolution- The 1994 Midterm Elections
The most salient set of issues in the 1994 midterm election was the rise of Newt Gingrich
and the subsequent so-called Republican Revolution. “The Republican Party gained 53 seats in
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the House of Representatives in the midterm elections, ending four decades of Democratic rule”
(Abramowitz 1995, 873). The result truly was upending, for “Bill Clinton would be the first
Democratic President to govern with a Republican Congress since Harry Truman from 19471949” (Abramowitz 1995, 873). Economic factors and midterm evaluations of the president do
not fully explain the outcome of the 1994 midterm elections. “Economic resurgence and
[President] Clinton’s foreign policy ‘successes’” did not benefit the Democratic party to the
point of maintaining the majority in Congress (Economic and Political Weekly 1994, 3006).
Yet, by considering the impact of the salient issue of the emergence of Newt Gingrich, the
investigation into what impacts congressional approval and midterm election outcomes may
become more complete.
The incumbent reelection rate in 1994 was 90.2% (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007).
This reelection rate is relatively low by historical standards. The low incumbent reelection rate
and the turnover in majority party, I believe, stem from the same source. The outcome of the
1994 elections was impacted by “deep discontent among voters with the federal government”
(Economic and Political Weekly 1994, 3006). The skill of Newt Gingrich and the Republican
leadership to blame the Democratic party for the seemingly malfunctioning legislature prompted
the electorate, in large part, to support Republican candidates for congressional office. “Most
Americans [believed] that government [was] too big, intrusive, wasteful and incompetent and
Democrats in particular [were] identified with big government and high taxes” (Economic and
Political Weekly 1994, 3006). In a gesture to play upon the public’s disdain for a lack of
transparency, Newt Gingrich put forth a Republican national proposal for the public’s
consideration. That platform was dubbed the “Contract with America.”
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The Contract with America begins by purporting to “restore the bonds of trust between
the people and their elected representatives” (United States House of Representatives 1994). The
need to restore such bonds alludes to the notion that the long-standing majority of the
Democratic party lost a necessary bond with the people in a republican form of government. The
Contract promises “no fine print,” highlighting the straightforwardness of the Republican plan,
which would have been a welcome change from what was perceived as congressional
inefficiency and ambiguity (United States House of Representatives 1994). The Contract recalls
President Lincoln, an enormously popular figure in American society, by promising “to act ‘with
firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right’” (United States House of Representatives
1994). Alluding to both President Lincoln and God allowed the Republican party to form a bond
with an increasingly conservative population across the country. In a straightforward manner,
the Contract (United States House of Representatives 1994) thereafter lists eight proposals to be
enacted immediately upon the installation of a Republican majority:

FIRST, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the
Congress; SECOND, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a
comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or abuse; THIRD, cut the number of
House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third; FOURTH, limit the terms of all
committee chairs; FIFTH, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee; SIXTH, require
committee meetings to be open to the public; SEVENTH, require a three-fifths majority
vote to pass a tax increase; EIGHTH, guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal
Budget by implementing zero base-line budgeting.

These eight proposals answer the fears of the people as outlined by Hibbing and TheissMorse (1995), namely a lack of accountability, efficiency, and fairness, while proposing to fix
the problems of “big government,” such as tax increases, proxy voting, and a federal deficit. In
addition, the Contract proposed that within the first hundred days of the 104th Congress, ten bills
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would be presented for debate, after the people had a chance to scrutinize each bill. The bills
focused on fiscal responsibility, conservative social reform, tax reductions, and lowering the
unemployment rate (United States House of Representatives 1994).

The Contract with America promised to cut taxes for the middle and upper-middle
classes, lower unemployment, and balance the federal budget (Economic and Political Weekly
1994). Gingrich’s platform was straightforward, national in scope, and was supported by much
of the electorate, which seemed to self-identify with conservatives to a greater degree in 1994
(Abramowitz 1995). As a result, Gingrich was able to mobilize voters across the country to
support the long-time minority Republican party in Congress. Part of the platform centered on
social conservatism, playing into the “moral/religious conservatism” that had been growing
across the country in the years immediately prior to the 1994 election cycle (Economic and
Political Weekly 1994, 3006). In addition to the proposals laid out in the Contract with America,
Gingrich continued his assault on the Democrats by labeling President Clinton a liberal elitist,
contrasting the chief executive with what he characterized as every day, middle-class Americans
(Economic and Political Weekly 1994).

Public approval of Congress in 1994 rested at 32.8%. In 1992, that rate was an even
lower 22%. Therefore, it seems that public approval of Congress in this case was not a directly
contributing factor of Democratic losses in 1994. Yet, Newt Gingrich effectively characterized
the Democratic party as the party of big government and inefficiency, playing on the fears of the
public espoused by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 2002) that Congress is too cumbersome in
its legislative output and ignores the true needs of the people. Although public approval of
Congress is historically low, Gingrich and the Republicans effectively capitalized on the growing
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discontent among the electorate with the workings of Congress. Therefore, public approval of
Congress was made into an important factor through the campaigning of Newt Gingrich.
Evidence of Gingrich’s success can be found in “the influence of ideological identification on the
vote” (Abramowitz 1995, 881). As Abramowitz (1995, 881) explains, “the most dramatic
increases in Republican voting came among self-identified Republicans and conservatives.” The
Republicans, who “overwhelmingly” supported Gingrich’s measure, put for a “much more
unified and ideological campaign than normal for a midterm election cycle” (Abramowitz 1995,
882). Newt Gingrich’s organizational skills and popular message enabled Republican gains.
This effective capitalization is what spurred the Republican Revolution. An ideological shift
took place in 1994, as more members of the electorate self-identified as conservative while
simultaneously identifying the Democrats as too liberal (Abramowitz 1995). In addition, the
people were excited oust the Democratic party, as 42% of the electorate who identified
themselves as Republicans or Republican-leaners were more enthusiastic about the 1994 election
cycle than previous midterm elections (Jones 2010). That percentage would not be beaten until
the 2010 midterm elections, when 59% of Republicans and Republican-leaners were more
enthusiastic about the midterm elections than during previous years (Jones 2010).
The emergence of the issue of big government and the ability of Newt Gingrich and the
Republican party to capitalize on the growing discontent of the public became the most salient
issue in the 1994 midterm elections and spurred the Republican Revolution. The election cycle
of 1994 serves as an outlier in that neither the economy nor the midterm evaluation of Bill
Clinton can wholly account for the massive seat losses incurred by the Democratic party. Thus, I
hypothesized that a salient issue became most paramount in affecting the election outcome. The
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issues pointed out by the Contract with America, which spurred the Republican Revolution, I
believe, more fully accounts for the outcome of the 1994 midterm elections.

Terrorism- The 2002 Midterm Elections
The outcome of the 2002 midterm elections also cannot fully be explained by the state of
the economy or by midterm evaluations of President Bush. As is discussed in Chapter Three of
this thesis, the economy was performing poorly in the lead up to the 2002 midterms. Consumer
sentiment was at a low point, achieving an index of 89.6 as measured by the University of
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. In addition, 5.8% of the people were unemployed in
2002, an increase from the unemployment rates in 2000 and 1998. Yet, the Republican party
gained seats in the 2002 midterm elections, strengthening its majority. Presidential approval
ratings do, in part, explain the successes of the Republican party in 2002. President Bush’s
approval ratings were relatively high in 2002, as were those of Congress. Public approval of
Congress in 2002 rested at 64.3% (Gallup 2011a). In addition, the incumbent reelection rate in
the House of Representatives was 96.2%. I believe that public approval of Congress helped the
Republicans’ chances of reelection given the importance of national security as an issue in the
2002 midterms and the emergence of patriotic fervor. One may ask the question, how did
Congress and the president escape negative consequences of a poorly performing economy? In
answering this question, the favorable approval ratings of the president and of Congress, as well
as the high incumbent reelection rate in 2002, were supported by the emergence of terrorism as a
salient issue.
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In September of 2002, a surprisingly small percentage of the American public, 19%,
believed that terrorism was “the most important problem facing the country” (Gallup 2002). Yet,
in October of 2002, one month before the congressional elections, 32% of the public believed
that terrorism was “the most important problem facing the country” (Gallup 2002). This
percentage was lower than the 46% of Americans who maintained that terrorism was the most
important issue in October of 2001, but that higher percentage was to be expected so soon after
September 11, 2001. It is interesting to note that come July 2002, the economy eclipsed
terrorism as “the most important problem facing the country” (Jones 2002, 1). Still, terrorism
was a close second, and had been identified as the most important issue by a plurality of
respondents since January of 2002 (Jones 2002). I believe that the economy, although
understandably identified by the public as the most important issue given high unemployment
and low consumer sentiment, did not have as big an impact on the election outcomes as did the
issue of terrorism. The general emergence of terrorism as an issue, the first time in our history
terrorism was identified as an important issue, had the greatest impact of any variable on the
2002 elections.
Whatever the reasons for the increase in the proportion of people who deemed terrorism
to be the most salient issue between September and October of 2002, whether as a consequence
of newly perceived threats or the result of effective campaigning by the Republican party, the
emergence of terrorism and national security as a leading issue benefitted the Republicans in
Congress. Jeffrey M. Jones (2002) forecasted that the Republicans would benefit if they could
make terrorism a vital campaign issue. The fact that a mere 16% of the public noted that they
were “very worried” about another terrorist attack in August of 2002 leads me to believe that the
Republicans’ campaigning, rather than actual terrorist threats, made terrorism a salient issue in
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2002. (Pew Research Center Publications 2010). The Republican party was deemed by the
public to be more able to handle national security issues than the Democratic party (Abramson,
Aldrich, and Rohde 2003). Jeffrey M. Jones (2002, 1) noted in August of 2002 that “to the
extent that Republicans can make terrorism the central issue in the 2002 midterm elections, they
stand to benefit in their quest to maintain control of the U.S. House.” Jones (2002) was correct
in his assessment, in that terrorism became the central issue for many Americans by the time of
the 2002 midterm elections. As a result, the incumbent reelection rate was higher than expected
given the state of the economy, and the Republican party maintained their control of the House
of Representatives. George W. Bush’s party even managed to gain seats in the House in the
2002 midterms, going against the historical pattern of the President’s party losing seats in the
House during the midterm elections (Campbell 1985). The importance of the issue of terrorism
to the outcome of the 2002 midterm elections is evidenced by the fact that, considering the weak
state of the economy, “had the terrorist attacks not occurred, Bush’s overall approval
rating…might have cost Republicans control of the House” (Jacobson 2003, 6-7).
In a poll for the Pew Research Center conducted in November of 2002, 69% of
respondents indicated that the federal government, which at the time had a Republican president
and Republican majority in the House of Representatives, was doing “very well” or “fairly well”
in “reducing the threat of terrorism” (PollingReport.com 2011b, 3). Therefore, given the relative
importance of terrorism as an issue identified by the public, the Republican party would stand to
benefit from such praise. In October of 2002, less than one month before the midterm elections,
52% of respondents to a CNN poll indicated that the Republicans would “do a better job of
dealing with” terrorism (PollingReport.com 2011b, 4). That percentage compares favorably to
only 23% of respondents who indicated that Democrats would do a better job handling the issue
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of terrorism (PollingReport.com 2011b, 4). The public confidence in the Republican party in
managing terrorism benefitted Republicans’ chances of election and reelection in the 2002
midterms. Given the importance of the issue to the public and the perception that the
Republicans were better able to protect the country from terrorism, the 2002 election results were
in large part a positive evaluation on the performance of the Republican leadership. The
Republican party was awarded with an increase in their majority in the House of
Representatives. High public approval of Congress, to be discussed in the next section in greater
detail, therefore benefited the Republican party in the 2002 elections.
Of interest to the relative importance of national security and terrorism for congressional
elections is the fact that after the 2002 midterm election cycle, terrorism was not an issue of
paramount importance to the American public. Frank Newport (2010, 1) wrote in September of
2010 that “nine years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 1% of Americans mention
terrorism as the most important problem facing the country.” The graph, adapted from Newport’s
(2010) article, of the proportion of Americans naming terrorism as the most important problem
facing the United States, is reproduced below.
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After a spike in the percentage of respondents who cited terrorism as the most salient
issue facing the country in September of 2001, that proportion dropped significantly over the
decade. Yet, despite this drop from 2001 to 2010, terrorism was still an issue of importance for
the 2002 midterm elections. I believe that the drop in the percentage of Americans who
identified terrorism as the most important issue facing the country supports my hypothesis of the
potential importance of salient issues for congressional elections outcomes. Terrorism seems to
have been an issue of great importance only for the 2002 midterm elections. By 2006, the year
of the next midterm election cycle, only approximately 5% of the American public named
terrorism as the issue of paramount importance facing the country. Thus, the impact of this
salient issue within the electoral context of 2002 is emphasized by the drop demonstrated in
Newport’s (2010) graph.
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Public Approval of Congress and Salient Issues Pertinent to a Specific Election Cycle
The importance of salient issues in their impact on public approval of Congress is not
readily apparent. At some level, public approval of Congress and salient issues are linked. The
response of Congress to emerging crises could impact the manner in which the public approves
of the national legislature. If the public is receptive to the way in which Congress responds to an
issue of great importance, public approval of Congress will become more positive. The example
of the 2002 midterm elections attests to this, in that the public was approving of the response of
George W. Bush and the Republican Congress to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001
(Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2003). A resounding 86% of respondents approved of the way
President Bush was “handling his job as president” three days after the terrorist attacks on 9/11
(Gallup 2009). Public approval of the Republican-majority Congress as an institution increased,
albeit for a short time. In October of 2001, 84% of respondents approved of the way “Congress
[was] handling its job,” up from 42% immediately before 9/11 (Gallup 2011a).
The midterm elections of 1994 also display a link, in that high levels of public
disapproval of Congress were a necessary factor for the Republican Revolution. Public approval
of Congress in 1994 was 32.8%. However, I believe that without a galvanizing Republican
leadership, the Republican takeover would not have occurred. Indeed, high levels of disapproval
of Congress are a staple of modern national politics. A necessary condition of the Republican
Revolution in 1994 seems to have been the catalyst that was the leadership of Newt Gingrich.
Without the emergence of Gingrich, public approval of Congress would probably not have been
a factor in the outcome of the 1994 elections. The addition of Gingrich’s popularity and
leadership to low public approval of Congress resulted in the importance of public approval of
Congress to the outcome of the 1994 elections.
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I can conclude that public approval of Congress has the potential to combine with salient
issues to effect congressional election outcomes. In the examples of the elections of 1994 and
2002, public approval of Congress was inherent to the issues which emerged as highly important.
However, other salient issues may not have the inherent element of public approval of Congress.
For example, regardless of the congressional response, a future terrorist attack could spur the
electorate to vote for a specific party. In 2002, the Republicans were thought to have a better
plan of attack in addressing terrorism and national security (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde
2003). This fact, rather than congressional responses, is what was most important for the
Republican party in maintaining its majority in the House of Representatives. Another example
could be focused on healthcare. If healthcare became a pressing and urgent issue, the political
party with the plan most agreeable to the public would benefit, regardless of public approval of
the previous Congress. Therefore, as a general rule, only in certain cases will public approval of
Congress combine with salient issues to impact congressional election outcomes. Such a
relationship can only be assessed on a case by case basis. Further research and analysis of
subsequent midterm election cycles will most probably offer more insight, as new issues become
salient in upcoming years.

Conclusion
This chapter focused on the role of emerging salient issues in congressional election
outcomes and public approval of Congress. I cannot in good faith point to a universal link
between salient issues and public approval of Congress. In 1994 and 2002, public approval of
Congress was central to the issues which became pressing and urgent. Therefore, in these cases,
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the issues of the emergence of Newt Gingrich and national security, and public approval of
Congress impacted each other. However, we will not know the extent of the impact of salient
issues on public approval of Congress until those issues manifest themselves in future election
cycles.
I did find a link however between emerging topical issues and congressional election
outcomes. I picked the years 1994 and 2002 because they were outliers in my initial analyses of
the impact of the economy and midterm evaluations of the president on congressional elections.
In 1994 the economy was strong and evaluations of President Clinton were positive, yet the
Democratic party lost a historic number of seats. Another issue must have accounted for the
abnormal election outcome. The biggest issue in the 1994 elections was the Republican
Revolution under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, who would become Speaker of the House.
The skill of the Republican party to nationalize the election and effectively denounce the
Democratic majority served to mobilize the electorate more so than in other election years. Their
Contract with America served as the Republicans’ platform, and was met with resounding
approval by the public. In 2002, the emerging issue was national security. The economy was
performing poorly, and the positive evaluations of President Bush and Congress were boosted by
their response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Republican party strengthened its majority in
the House due to what the public perceived as a more coherent party platform in comparison
with the Democrats concerning the issue of national security (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde
2003). Neither the economy nor midterm evaluations of the president directly affected the
outcome of the 2002 congressional elections. Rather, the emergence of national security as an
issue is what most impacted the midterm elections.
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This chapter completes my inquiry into what impacts congressional elections and public
disapproval levels of Congress. Emerging issues of urgency have the potential to impact an
election outcome to a greater extent than the standbys of the economy and midterm evaluations
of the president. These issues do not necessarily impact public approval levels of Congress, but
may inherently contain an element of public opinion. What I can offer with confidence is when
the economy and midterm evaluations of the president do not wholly account for congressional
election outcomes, another issue of emerging importance can account for which political party
fares better in a given election cycle.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion

This thesis endeavored to discover what influences midterm congressional election
outcomes, and to see if public approval of Congress plays a role in these outcomes. I asked three
main questions: under what conditions does public approval of Congress change, what are the
determinants for congressional election outcomes, and what is the link, if any, between public
approval of Congress and election outcomes? First, I began with an overview of why the public
dislikes Congress. There are a variety of reasons the public disapproves of Congress, including
distrust of the members of Congress, disdain for the legislative process, disagreement with the
policies of the legislative branch, perceived inefficiency and corruption of Congress as an
institution, and negative perceptions of Congress fostered by the media and external variables
such as the state of the economy. These variables have the potential to lower public approval
levels of Congress. Approval levels of the first branch of government have suffered in modern
times. In the literature review of this thesis, I also discussed the variables impacting
congressional election outcomes in general. Incumbency, gerrymandering, campaign finance,
party identification, national trends, the media, and the economy all, to some extent, affect
congressional election outcomes. Incumbency plays the biggest role in congressional election
outcomes, in that since World War Two, incumbents have enjoyed a mid-ninety percent
reelection rate in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Discussing public approval
of Congress and congressional election outcomes in general set the stage for my research, which
was to analyze the potential impact of public approval of Congress on the outcomes of midterm
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congressional elections. Yet, the influence of public approval of Congress on election outcomes
remained unclear. Developing a theory for a link between public approval of Congress and
midterm election outcomes was the necessary next step for analyzing whether or not public
approval of Congress truly impacted congressional election outcomes.

Public Approval of Congress and Congressional Elections: A Link
Forming a theory about the link between public approval of Congress and congressional
elections was the focus of Chapter Two. In the second chapter of this thesis, I formed my own
hypotheses to test the presence of a link between public approval of Congress and election
outcomes in the House of Representatives. I chose to limit my research to the House of
Representatives because it is more susceptible to fluctuations in public approval, given that
Senators are elected to longer six-year terms in office. I posited that changes in the state of the
economy, midterm evaluations of the performance of the President of the United States, and the
emergence of pressing issues particular to a given election cycle have the potential to both upset
public approval of Congress and impact congressional election outcomes. I hypothesized that
the economy had the biggest effect on congressional election outcomes and public approval of
Congress. However, any of these groups of issues could negatively impact incumbents’
reelection rates, thus affecting congressional election outcomes, as well as impact public
approval levels of Congress.
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The Economy, Public Approval of Congress, and Congressional Elections
Chapter Three of this thesis explored the effect of the economy on congressional election
outcomes and public approval of Congress. I first began with an analysis of unemployment, in
the belief that high levels of unemployment would precipitate low incumbent reelection rates and
high disapproval of Congress. Incumbent reelection rates were not routinely impacted by
fluctuations in the unemployment rate. In addition, I found that unemployment did not steadily
impact levels of public approval of Congress. There were years when unemployment was high
and approval of Congress was low, but there were also years when unemployment was low and
approval of Congress was likewise low. Therefore, still believing that the economy plays a
significant role in approval levels of Congress and congressional election outcomes, I analyzed
consumer sentiment, a measurement routinely gathered by the University of Michigan.
Consumer sentiment proved to be a stronger link to approval levels of Congress and
incumbent losses than did unemployment. In general, when consumer sentiment was low,
incumbents were more likely to be ousted from office. Likewise, when consumer sentiment was
high, incumbent candidates maintained their long-standing advantage. Pertaining to public
approval of Congress, when consumer sentiment was high, approval ratings of Congress rose,
and when consumer sentiment was low, approval ratings dropped. There was a strong positive
correlation between consumer sentiment and both approval levels of Congress and incumbent
reelection rates. Thus, consumer sentiment as a measure of the economic health of the nation
made for a convincing argument as to the effect of public approval ratings of Congress on
congressional election outcomes. Part of the link between public approval of Congress and
election outcomes was discovered through an economic analysis focusing on consumer
sentiment. Consumer sentiment affected public approval levels of Congress and congressional
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elections in much the same way, making for a persuasive case for a relationship between
congressional approval and midterm election outcomes through the variable of consumer
sentiment levels.
In general terms, when analyzing the effect of the economy on public approval of
Congress, I did find a relationship existed. Consumer sentiment trended well with public
approval of Congress. The unemployment rate proved to be a less useful variable in analyzing
public approval of Congress and election outcomes. An analysis of specific midterm election
cycles confirmed the data I analyzed in Chapter Three. In 1998, a strong economy, marked by
high consumer sentiment and low unemployment, helped maintain high incumbent reelection
rates. In addition, public approval levels of Congress and of President Clinton were higher than
usual. Therefore, despite the personal scandals of President Clinton, the economy benefitted
members of Congress in both political parties. In 2010, a poorly performing economy, namely
one in which consumer sentiment was at a low point and unemployment hovered around 9.7%,
hurt the chances of members of the Democratic majority in Congress. As a result, the incumbent
reelection rate was historically low. Underscoring the turnover in majority party in the House of
Representatives was the fact that public approval levels of Congress in 2010 were very low. In
1994, a well-performing economy was not enough to halt the progress of the Republican party
and the leadership of Newt Gingrich. Despite a powerful economy, with high consumer
sentiment and a reasonable unemployment rate, the Democratic party suffered historic losses in
the midterm elections. The cycle of 1994 forced me to expand my set of hypotheses examining
what impacts congressional elections and public approval of Congress. Likewise, the 2002
election cycle took place on the background of a poorly performing economy, marked by high
unemployment and low consumer sentiment. Yet, the Republican party maintained its majority
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in the House of Representatives. The election cycles of 1994 and 2002 served as outliers in need
of further explanation.

Evaluations of the President, Public Approval of Congress, and Congressional Elections
One of the explanations I put forth for explaining the outliers that were the midterm
elections of 1994 and 2002 was that midterm election cycles are impacted by public evaluations
of the president at the time of the midterms. Chapter Four explores the effect of midterm
evaluations of the president on public approval levels of Congress and congressional election
outcomes. Presidential performance did not have a great impact on the results of the 1994 and
2002 midterm elections, but more light was shed on the power of presidential performance after
analyzing the 1998 and 2010 midterm elections. My data show that as the public is more
approving of the president, incumbent reelection rates are more likely to be maintained than
when the president is looked upon with disfavor by the public. This long-term correlation
provided evidence for the influence of presidential approval ratings on congressional election
outcomes. In addition to the impact of presidential approval ratings on incumbent reelection
rates, I hypothesized that midterm evaluations of the president also affect the number of seats the
president’s political party loses during the midterms. I believed that the higher the approval of
the president, the lower the number of seats the president’s party loses in the midterms.
Likewise, the lower the approval rating, the higher the number of seats lost by the president’s
party in the midterms. My hypothesis in this regard was incorrect. The data showed mixed
results as to the effect of presidential popularity on the number of seats lost by the president’s
party during the midterm elections.
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The impact of presidential approval ratings on public approval of Congress at the time of
the midterm elections is evident. In general, when presidential approval levels rise, public
approval levels of Congress increase. Likewise, when the public disapproves of the president’s
performance, approval ratings of Congress are lower. A strong positive correlation across time
exists for public approval levels of Congress and presidential approval levels during the midterm
elections. Perhaps the enhanced role of the president in proposing legislation and being a more
persuasive and public force in what has historically been Congress’ domain has led the people to
conflate the performances of the chief executive and the national legislature. Regardless, a link
between presidential approval ratings and public approval levels of Congress is apparent. It is
possible that a third factor influences both presidential approval and congressional approval
simultaneously and with similar effects. A persuasive argument could be put forth for the effect
of patriotism in such a manner for the 2002 midterm cycle. In addition, one could put forth an
argument that public approval levels of Congress are what really impact presidential approval
ratings. However, to this point, I believe that the notoriety of the President of the United States
outweighs that of individual members of Congress and Congress as a whole. Thus, barring a
third variable, I believe that midterm evaluations of the president impact public approval levels
of Congress as well as congressional election outcomes. A link between the three exists, much
like that between the economy, midterm election outcomes, and public approval levels of
Congress I found in Chapter Three.
I finished Chapter Four with case studies of the elections of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010
to see if midterm evaluations of the president impacted these election years and/or public
approval levels of Congress during those years. I found that evaluations of the president
impacted election outcomes as well as approval levels of Congress, although to a lesser extent.
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In 1998, a positive evaluation of Bill Clinton helped the Democratic party regain seats in the
House of Representatives. This positive association with Clinton was due in large part to a
bustling economy, in spite of Clinton’s personal scandals. The public based its positive
evaluation of Clinton not on the Lewinsky scandal, but on the president’s success as an
officeholder. In 2002, positive evaluations of George W. Bush helped the Republicans maintain
their majority. The positive reaction to the way in which Bush and his party responded to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, accounted for Bush’s high levels of public approval. In
2010, the public in large part found the performance of Barack Obama unsatisfactory, most
probably due to the poorly performing economy and the inability of the president to remedy the
situation, whatever the reasonableness of such a demand. As a result, Democratic candidates
could not count on President Obama to influence voters in a positive manner to the benefit of the
party as they had with Bill Clinton in 1998. Finally, public opinion of the president in 1994 was
more negative than usual, but did not account for the massive seat losses incurred by the
Democrats in what became known as the Republican Revolution. Rather, the emerging issue of
the nationalization of the election by Newt Gingrich and the effective nature of his mobilizing
the public against the Democratic party spurred Republican gains.

Salient Issues, Public Approval of Congress, and Congressional Elections
Chapter Five focused on the impact of emerging salient issues on congressional election
outcomes and public approval levels of Congress. I focused on the election cycles of 1994 and
2002 in this chapter, in that the economy and midterm evaluations of the president sufficiently
explained the election outcomes and the role of public approval of Congress in 1998 and 2010,
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but did not fully explain the outcome or the role of public approval of Congress in 1994 and
2002. Public approval of Congress proved to be an important factor in the outcomes of 1994 and
2002. Another factor became paramount in importance for the years 1994 and 2002. In 1994,
that salient issue was the emergence of Newt Gingrich and the subsequent Republican
Revolution. The Republican Revolution, which stressed the importance of transparency in
government and the inefficiency of the “big government” of the Democratic party was the most
important issue for the outcome of the 1994 midterm elections. Gingrich effectively mobilized a
large portion of the electorate to oust the Democrats from the majority in the House of
Representatives. For his efforts, Gingrich was made Speaker of the House, symbolizing and
solidifying the importance of his leadership for the Republican party. Low public approval of
Congress in 1994 was a necessary factor for the advent of the Republican Revolution. Although
levels of public approval of Congress were not abnormally low, Gingrich and the Republican
leadership effectively capitalized on the public’s disapproval to secure the majority in Congress.
Thus, public approval of Congress played a crucial role in the outcome and was inherent to the
issue of paramount importance in the 1994 midterm elections.
The salient issue of 2002 was national security, following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Neither the economy nor midterm evaluations of President Bush could
account for the triumph of the Republican party in the midterm elections of 2002. The economy
was not performing well, marred most noticeably by low consumer sentiment. One would
expect the majority party in Congress to suffer with the background of a suffering economy.
Yet, the Republican party gained seats as a result of the 2002 midterms. President Bush’s
approval ratings most probably helped the Republicans in Congress, but positive evaluations of
the president stemmed from the Republican response to 9/11. The Republicans were thought to
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have a better plan for ensuring the safety of the country and combating terrorism in comparison
with the Democratic party. In 2002, what mattered most was not the state of the economy, which
according to historical patterns should have benefitted the Democrats, but the fear of subsequent
terrorist attacks. Public opinion at the time ranked terrorism as one of the most important
problems facing the country, and therefore the unique issue of national security affected the 2002
midterm election outcome more so than did the economy or evaluations of President Bush.
Public approval of Congress was augmented by its response to the terrorist attacks.
Solidarity with the president most probably added to the Republican majority’s benefit as a
manifestation of patriotism. The public in general supported Congress, especially since the body
was willing to act to ensure the nation’s security. In 2002, public approval of Congress was
historically quite high, a result of increased patriotism and approval of the way in which the
Republican majority responded with President Bush to 9/11. Therefore, the salient issue of
national security in 2002 positively impacted public approval of Congress to the benefit of the
majority in the House of Representatives. This high level of public approval of Congress most
probably positively impacted Republican incumbents’ chances of reelection.

Public Approval of Congress and its Impact on Congressional Election Outcomes
In general, I can tentatively put forth the argument that public approval of Congress does
indeed impact congressional election outcomes, but only in certain circumstances. A poorly
performing economy will hurt incumbents’ chances of reelection in the midterm elections, and
vice versa. Related is the fact that a poorly performing economy will negatively impact public
approval of Congress. The midterm cycle of 2010 testifies to this phenomenon. Negative
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evaluations of the president will hurt the president’s party in the midterm elections, and positive
evaluations of the president will benefit incumbents. Interestingly, the president’s performance
does not have as great an effect on the outcome of midterm elections, in that the president’s party
has lost seats in the midterm elections every year since 1974 save the 1998 and 2002 cycles.
Still, a connection between presidential approval and election outcomes is evident. In general, if
the president is evaluated positively, incumbents will be more successful in the midterms. It
seems to be the case that a poorly evaluated president negatively impacts public approval levels
of Congress, and vice versa. Still, a third factor may influence both presidential approval and
congressional approval, as was the case in the 2002 midterm elections when patriotism affected
both of these levels. The election cycle of 1998 testifies to the importance of external factors, in
that President Clinton’s approval ratings were high, as were those of Congress. A correlation
exists here, although a causal relationship is suspect due to the positive economy in 1998.
Perhaps further research will test the existence of a causal relationship. Regardless, a correlation
between presidential approval and congressional approval can yield insight into the forces
affecting congressional elections. Finally, salient issues impact public approval of Congress, in
that the public will either approve or disapprove of Congress’ response to newly pressing issues,
such as national security or the unacceptable rise of “big government.” The election cycles of
1994 and 2002 demonstrate the power of pressing issues. I believe that salient issues impact
public approval of Congress, but can only be determined to have such an impact after the fact,
given that issues unique to an election year can become pressing without prior notice. In all, I
believe that public approval of Congress can impact congressional elections, but such a
relationship is not universal for every election cycle. The potential exists, especially when the
economy, the performance of the president, and newly pressing issues are at the forefront of the

111

public agenda, but public approval of Congress does not necessarily impact all congressional
elections. The conclusions I reached in studying the election outcomes of 1994, 1998, 2002, and
2010 are mixed when assessing the role of public approval of Congress. In 1994 and 2002,
public approval of Congress played a role, I believe, in the election outcomes. The 1994 election
cycle witnessed the negative effects of public disapproval of Congress when that dissatisfaction
was capitalized upon by Newt Gingrich and the Republican leadership. In 2002, positive
evaluations of Congress allowed the Republicans to maintain their majority with the assistance
of increased patriotism. However, in 1998 and 2010, public approval of Congress was not a
central factor in the election outcomes. In 1998, positive evaluations of President Bill Clinton
benefitted the Democratic party, and in 2010 a poorly performing economy negatively impacted
the Democratic majority in the House. In all, public approval of Congress can impact election
outcomes, but only, it seems, in unique circumstances.

Limitations
There were limitations to the hypotheses I put forth and the data I collected in trying to
prove these hypotheses. First, I encountered a lack of data in some areas. For example, the exit
polls available for most years were not available for the 2002 midterm elections. The Voter
News Service, the organization which conducts exit polls for major news sources, cited problems
with the reporting of the exit polls. I used exit poll data for much of my research on how the
public perceived the state of the economy, Congress, and the president. The fact that major news
sources such as ABC and CNN would not release exit polls made finding this information much
more difficult given my immediate resources and time constraints. Although I was able to gauge
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the mood of the public and gather other data for the 2002 midterms, such as consumer sentiment,
the unemployment rate, the incumbent reelection rate, public approval of Congress, and
evaluations of President George W. Bush, the exit poll data for that year may have enhanced my
analysis.
Another obstacle to my research was a lack of specific information about public approval
levels of Congress. Although the data on public approval ratings of Congress were easy to find,
less available was polling as to why the public disapproved of Congress. My literature review on
the overview of why the people dislike Congress was beneficial, but lacked specific examples for
the reasons put forth. Original research on my part, I believe, helped to fill this hole, given my
cross-analyses of public approval of Congress and the way in which the public evaluated other
factors, such as the economy and the president. However, given my limitations, the results I
gathered may not tell the whole story as to why the public disapproved of Congress across
election cycles. Scholarly accounts and news stories helped answer this question, but hard
evidence explaining why public approval ratings of Congress fluctuated for multiple years was
largely unavailable. Although the inability to holistically answer this question did not undermine
my own conclusions, having this information available could have provided more insight as to
the role of public approval of Congress in determining midterm election outcomes.
Given my time limitation, working on the project from September 2010 to March 2011, I
had to choose selectively which election years I would analyze in detail. I chose the years 1994,
1998, 2002, and 2010 because they fit well with my hypothesis. I posited that public approval of
Congress may have an effect on congressional election outcomes when external factors, such as
the performance of the economy, the performance of the president, and newly emerging issues of
urgent importance dominate the public agenda. I initially chose the 1994 midterm election cycle
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because the Republican Revolution was a unique occurrence and I wanted to discover the
underlying reasons for its emergence. I chose the 2010 election cycle because I believed it to be
a classic example of the importance of the economy on the election outcomes. The 2002 election
cycle was unique for the legacy of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which I believed to have great
importance on the outcomes. Finally, the 1998 election provided the unique backdrop of the
Monica Lewinsky scandal. The 1998 midterms therefore provided an opportunity to uncover the
role of presidential approval on election outcomes. The effect of the state of the economy,
midterm evaluations of the president, and salient issues on public approval of Congress and
congressional elections could be thoroughly analyzed through an in depth study of these four
election cycles. Yet, deeper analyses of other election cycles could broaden the scope of
research in this area. For example, the 2006 midterm election cycle provided the Democratic
party with its first majority in the House of Representatives since 1994. Uncovering why the
Republicans lost the majority could provide additional insight into how public approval of
Congress impacts congressional elections. Perhaps the intricacies of other election years could
shed light on nuances I did not uncover in my research pertaining to public approval of Congress
and congressional elections.
My hypothesis on the impact of newly emerging salient issues on public approval of
Congress and midterm elections did account for the outlier years, 1994 and 2002, which could
not fully be explained by the economy nor by midterm evaluations of the president. Although
perhaps not a limitation of this thesis, the hypothesis I put forth cannot be tested until emerging
issues besides the economy and presidential performance surface. That is, one won’t be able to
analyze the impact of a salient issue until it manifests itself in a specific election year. The
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formation of a more concrete hypothesis, one that can be tested objectively and across time may
help to alleviate the subjective nature of this portion of my hypothesis.

Conclusion
I believe that an examination of public approval of Congress and congressional elections
is beneficial to expanding the knowledge in this area. As of now, analyses of elections focus on
the outcome, rather than the underlying psychological mechanisms which produce that outcome.
Perhaps the outcomes of election cycles are rightfully the focus, instead of why those outcomes
took place. Yet, the role of public approval of Congress is demonstrable and can provide insight
into why voters choose certain candidates over others. This information could be used by the
representatives themselves to more effectively advocate on behalf of their constituents and their
political desires. I believe that, although future research is warranted given my time and
resource limitations, reading this thesis will allow students of political science to more easily
predict the outcome of future elections and understand why a certain outcome took place. In
addition, studying public approval of Congress yields a better understanding of our democratic
system, how it works, what its problems are, and how to improve upon the relationship between
citizen and representative. Doing so, it is my hope, can restore the respect that I believe the first
branch of our government deserves. Congress is seen as ineffective and is derided by the general
public. The founders of this country determined that Congress should be the most powerful of
the branches, but it has fallen in esteem. Perhaps a better understanding of Congress, public
approval of the branch, and election mechanisms, central to our democratic style of government,
will benefit the institution as well as those living under its auspices.
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